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The Arab Maghreb Union: Possibilities of
Maghrebine Political and Economic
Unity, and Enhanced Trade in the World
Community
Robert W. McKeon, Jr.*
I. Introduction
On February 17, 1989, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco,
and Tunisia signed the Treaty to Constitute the Union of the Arab
Maghreb (Treaty) in Marrakesh, Morocco.' The Arab Maghreb
Union (Union) now comprises sixty-two million people within a re-
* J.D. Case Western Reserve University, 1991; M.A. Middlebury College, 1988; A.B.
College of the Holy Cross, 1987.
1. The Treaty Creating the Union of the Arab Maghreb was supplied by the United
States Department of State and translated from the original in Arabic [hereinafter AMU
Treaty]. French translations of the Treaty may be found at 124 MAGHREB MACHREK: LE
MONDE ARABE 127-30 (J. Jangor director, April-June 1989) [hereinafter Jangor]. 94 Revue
gnrale de droit international public 552-56 (1990) [hereinafter RGDIP]. In interpreting the
articles of the Treaty, the author found it necessary to refer to both the English and French
versions. See also infra note 115 footnote and accompanying text. For a map of the area, see
L'ETAT DU MAGHREB 21 (C. Lacoste & Y. Lacoste eds. 1991):
LTAT DU MAGHREB GtOGRAPHIE
..... U R S S ul Maghreb arabe
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gion rich in oil, natural.gas, fish, and minerals.' The purpose for its
creation was to promote political and economic integration,3 as well
as to afford the Member States more leverage with the European
Economic Community (EEC) in the advent of 1992. Therefore, de-
termined to accelerate their economic integration, the Member
States announced plans for a customs union by 1995."
Successful regional integration, as anticipated by the Arab
Maghreb Union, requires that the member states' interests converge
on cultural, political, and economic levels.' With the goal of deter-
mining whether the Arab Maghreb Union is viable, Part II of this
Article will begin by examining the individual interests of each
Member State, the construction of the Treaty, -and regional coopera-
tion presently achieved. Part III will analyze the Arab Maghreb
Union's duties under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), as well as the implications of European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC) agreements and United States legislation.
II. The Arab Maghreb Union
A. Common Cultural Background
The Maghreb comprises five countries: Algeria, Libya, Mo-
rocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia.' The Maghreb region has been in-
habited by human beings since prior to the fifteenth millennium
B.C. 7 The two known prehistoric cultures which inhabited North Af-
rica8 are the Oranian and the Capsian.9 Meanwhile, Mauritania was
occupied by the nomadic Brands who were of the same race as the
Oranians and the Capsians.10 Furthermore, the territory of Maurita-
2. North African States For Joint Parliament, The Reuter Library Report (June 10,
1989) (LEXiS, Nexis library, Omni file).
3. Murphy, Briefing Paper; North Africa Moves toward Joint Market, L.A. Times,
July 17, 1990, H4, col. I. In addition, King Hassan II of Morocco stated that: "Our aim is to
turn the Arab Maghreb into one country, with one passport, one identity and a single cur-
rency." Id.
4. World in Brief, North Africa; 5 Maghreb Nations vow to speed Ties, L.A. Times,
July 24, 1990, A, col. I.
5. The political level includes aspects of ideology and strategy. The economic level also
includes financial concerns. Belaid, Les perspectives de construction d'un grand Maghreb uni,
27 Revue algkrienne des sciences juridiques, conomiques et politiques 493, 495-96 (1989).
6. See LE GRAND MAGHREB (A. Claisse & G. Conac eds. 1988). The name Maghreb,
given to this conglomeration of countries, is Arabic for the land of the sunset. J. ABUN-NASR,
A HISTORY OF THE MAGHRIB 1 (1971).
7. J. ABUN-NASR, supra note 6, at 7.
8. North Africa refers to Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.
9. J. ABUN-NASR, supra note 6, at 7. These were Stone Age cultures.
The Oranian culture flourished in the coastal hinterland of the Mediterranean Sea and
spread as far east as Egypt. The Capsian culture mostly centralized itself in the Algerian parts
of the Atlas mountains and their Tunisian slopes. The Capsian culture later spread north to
the coast where it influenced the Oranian culture. Id.
10. C. BELVAUDE. LA MAURITANIA 14 (1989).
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nia was shared between the Brands and the black Africans."
With the advent of trade in the Mediterranean area, the
Phoenicians were the first to come into contact with the Oranians
and the Capsians around 1000 B.C.' 2 The Phoenicians colonized
much of the northern coast of present day Tunisia and founded Car-
thage in 814 B.C.' a Although Phoenicia soon thereafter was overrun
by the Assyrians, Carthage continued to grow. By the sixth century
B.C., its territory included several coastal cities from Morocco to
Libya.' 4
Carthaginian domination of the Maghreb ended in 146 B.C.
when Rome destroyed Carthage and assumed its empire. 15 During
the Roman occupation, the territory of the Maghreb was divided for
administrative purposes into provinces." From these provinces
evolved the present boundaries of the Maghrebine countries., 7
The European domination of North Africa through the Roman
Empire, and later by the Byzantine Empire, ended at approximately
670 A.D. in light of the victorious Arabs.'" The Arabs acquired com-
plete control of the region and successfully established the, Islamic
religion.' 9 In addition, the Arabic language completely replaced
Latin, although many of the people continued to speak local Berber
dialects.2" This Arab conquest was to alienate the Maghrebine coun-
I1. Id.
12. L. HAHN. NORTH AFRICA: NATIONALISM TO NATIONHOOD 2 (1960).
13. Id. The Phoenicians needed purple molluscs, which were found in the area, for their
dye industry. The Phoenicians also founded Utica and Tunis.
14. J. ABUN-NASR, supra note 6, at 15. It was from this occupation that the word "Lib-
yan" was derived - a Greek name referring to non-Phoenicians living within the Carthaginian
state. In addition, the Greeks called the indigenous population of the region which did not live
within the Carthaginian State "Numidians," a word which means the nomads. Id. at 7.
15. J, NICKERSON, A SHORT HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA 5 (1961). Roman-Byzantine
control lasted until the middle of the seventh century. Id. During this occupation, the indige-
nous people were called "Berbers," a derivation of the Latin barbari (barbarians). J. ABUN-
NASR, supra note 6, at 7. This name has continued and today the people of the Maghreb,
there included Mauritania (excepting the black population), are known as the Berbers. Id.; C
BELVAUDE, supra note 10, at 14.
16. C. BELVAUDE, supra note 10, at 31-33.
17. J. ABuN-NASR, supra note 6, at 31-33. Mauritania Tingitana was the name given to
the territory from which Morocco is presently comprised. Id. at 33. Algeria was comprised of
Caesarian Mauritania, Sitifian Mauritania, and Numidia. Id. at 32. Proconsular Africa and
Byzacenia were the predecessors of Tunisia. Tripolitania stretched across the present day Lib-
yan coastline.
18. J. NICKERSON, supra note 15, at 58-59. Arab generally refers to the people originat-
ing from the Arabian Peninsula. I THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 1043 (1977). This
definition is, however, too traditional. An Arab is anyone from an Arab country who speaks
Arabic, whether Christian or Moslem, Moroccan or Saudi Arabian. al-Husri, Qu'est-ce que
l'arabisme?, L'tTAT DU MAGHREB 375 (C. Lacoste & Y. Lacoste eds. 1991).
19. J. NICKERSON, supra note 15, at 61. This included even Mauritania which was never
under Roman or Byzantine domination. C. BELVAUDE, supra note 10, at 13-14.
20. J. NICKERSON, supra note 15, at 65. See supra note 15 text, defining Berber. Berber
dialects continue to be spoken in remote areas of the Maghreb, but have been losing ground to
Arabic as the countries become more urbanized and the level of education increases. Lacoste,
Gbographie Le Grand Maghreb, un vaste ensemble gbopolitique, L'tTAT DU MAGHREB 19, 20
(1991).
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tries from Western influence for more than one thousand years."
In 1337 the Muslim Turks attacked Constantinople, thereby
crossing into Europe.2 Determined to repel Islam, the Pope called
for a crusade. a The Christian nations responded by attacking sev-
eral Maghrebine ports on the Mediterranean Sea.2' With the threat
of constant Christian incursions into North Africa, the Maghreb
sought the protection of the powerful Ottoman Empire during the
sixteenth century.25 Under Ottoman control, three kingdoms were es-
tablished in the countries of Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria. Mean-
while, Morocco became an independent kingdom, 6 and Mauritania
remained isolated as an independent, Moorish kingdom.27
By the nineteenth century, the prospects of rich commerce drew
France to the Maghreb.28 In 1830 France began incursions into Al-
geria" and, by 1848, declared Algeria to be a French territory.30
Next, Tunisia fell to the French conquerors upon their invasion in
1881.31 Two years later, in 1883, Tunisia was made a French protec-
torate, and its colonization followed. 32 Then French incursions into
Mauritania began in 1855, but the interior of the country was not
penetrated until 1902. as By 1912, Mauritania became part of French
West Africa and became a colony in 1920.1' Finally, Morocco there-
after fell to the French in 1912, and it was immediately transformed
21. Id. at 62.
22. A. LAROUI. THE HISTORY OF THE MAGHRIB, 232 (1977) [Trans. R. Manheim].
23. Id.
24. Id. at 233. The result of these attacks was the establishment of Christian hegemony
over the Mediterranean, thereby resulting in Christian monopolization of trade and commerce.
Id. at 234.
During the Middle Ages, the countries of North Africa became known as the Barbary
States. Barbary is a word derived from Latin meaning barbarian. J. NICKERSON, supra note
15, at 4. This, of course, excludes Mauritania since it does not border on the Mediterranean
Sea. The Barbary States were comprised of warring kingdoms. Id. at 69.
The Barbary States were never again to enjoy the prosperity and security which they had
enjoyed under Rome. Id. The Barbary States, unable to further defend their own commerce on
the Mediterranean and thereby growing poor, resorted to piracy. A. LAROUI, supra note 22, at
234.
25. J. NICKERSON, supra note 15, at 73.
26. Id. Nevertheless, the established kingdoms in Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria were given
much autonomy. It was under this Ottoman protection that the three eastern Maghrebine
Kingdoms continued their profitable practice of piracy. Id. at 76. The history of Morocco has
continuously been marked by a desire to be independent. Rousset, Le syst'me politique du
Maroc, in 1LE GRAND MAGHREB 52, 53 (A. Claisse & G. Conac, eds. 1988).
27. C. BELVAUDE, supra note 10, at 17. "Moors" refers to the mixture of the Arabs and
the Berbers. Id.
28. In addition, Europe had become tired of the Barbary piracy. J. NICKERSON, supra
note 15, at 97.
29. J. ABUN-NASR, supra note 6, at 238.
30. Id. at 250.
31. Id. at 278-79.
32. Id. at 279, 281-82.
33. C. BELVAUDE, supra note 10, at 21.
34. Id. at 22.
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into a French protectorate.3 5
After the French incursions into North Africa began, Libya ex-
perienced a separate evolution apart from the rest of the Maghrebine
countries. Fearful of Christian intervention in North Africa, the Ot-
toman Empire used Libya as a buffer to protect the Empire's stand-
ing in the Middle East." Thus, in 1835 the Ottomans set out ruth-
lessly to assert absolute control and direct authority over Libya.3"
This intense authority kept Libya isolated from Europe until 1911
when Italy, who desired to create its own empire, invaded Libya.38
In 1912 the Italians and the Ottomans formally signed a treaty of
peace, whereby Italy gained sovereignty over Libya.39
The Maghrebine Countries continued to be subjected to foreign
domination until the end of World War II. Libya was the first of the
countries to gain its independence on December 24, 1951, pursuant
to a United Nations resolution. ° Morocco followed when on March
2, 1956, France recognized Moroccan independence after years of
terrorist attacks on the French."' Similarly, France submitted to ter-
rorist pressures in Tunisia and declared Tunisian independence on
March 20, 1956.42 Mauritania peacefully gained its independence on
November 28, 1960.13 France's final Maghrebine possession, Algeria,
gained its independence on July 5, 1962, after a long and costly
conflict."
The Maghrebine States had never known complete indepen-
dence until the retreat of the European powers following World War
II. Since the earliest days of Phoenician intervention in 1000 B.C. to
35. J. ABUN-NASR, supra note 6, at 303.
36. Id. at 303. The Ottomans did not want the French to expand any farther east. Id. at
304.
37. Martel, Souverainel et autorit ottomane: La province de Tripoli au couchant, in
ETATS. TERRITOIRES ET TERROIRS AU MAGHREB 75-76 (P. Baudel ed. 1985).
38. Id. at 85.
39. Accordo preliminare di pace Ira l'talia e la Turchia sequito da un firmano imperi-
ale, da un decreto reale e da un jadr4 imperiale [Preliminary Treaty of Peace between Italy
and Turkey Resulting from an Imperial Firman, a Royal Decree and an Imperial ladre], Oct.
15, 1912, Italy-Turkey, 22 Trattati e Convenzioni 226 (Jan. 1, 1912-Dec. 31, 1913), 217
C.T.S. 137.
40. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: LIBYA I
(1989) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES: LIBYA]. Due to the defeat of Italy in World War II,
Libya was the first African state to gain independence from a European ruler. In addition, it
was the only state to have ever been created by the United Nations General Assembly. J.
DAVIS, LIBYAN POLITICS: TRIBE AND REVOLUTION 1 (1987).
41. J. ABUN-NASR, supra note 6, at 377.
42. Id. at 353.
43. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: MAURITA-
NIA I (1987) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES: MAURITANIA]. Mauritanians always resisted
French domination, but Mauritania's transition from a colony to an independent State from
1958 to 1960 was accomplished with French approval and assistance. Id. at 4; C. BELVAUDE.
supra note 10, at 22.
44. J. ABUN-NASR, supra note 6, at 340; BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE. BACKGROUND NOTES: ALGERIA 1 (1988) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES:
ALGERIA].
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the Roman and then Arab and Ottoman rule, the North African
countries have shared a common foreign domination."" This domina-
tion only diverged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when
France gained control of the western Maghrebine Countries and
when Italy conquered Libya. Mauritania, lying farther south, has
shared Arab and French domination.
The Maghreb's common religion and history, coupled with a
common people, established significant and fraternal links which fos-
ter a common cultural identity. None of these states would ever al-
low itself to be cut-off from its historical and cultural identity, and
this identity serves to unify the Maghreb.4" This common identity
provides the impetus toward any tangible, political and economic
unity, and it is the only driving force to bring the Maghrebine Coun-
tries toward resolving their differing political and economic
policies.47
B. Political and Governmental Structures of the Maghreb
From the independence of the Maghrebine Countries, during
the latter half of this century, each state has developed different po-
litical and ideological platforms. These differing platforms often
have seriously affected their intra-regional relations and have
blocked any cooperation between the states, especially in the area of
economic cooperation.48 In addition, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tu-
nisia are politically aligned with the West. Algeria and Libya remain
staunchly anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist, while preferring closer
relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.),
rather than with the West.4" As best stated by King Hassan II of
Morocco: "Disparity . .. is extremely detrimental to regional
blocs."50
45. The one exception to this is the autonomy which Morocco enjoyed from the six-
teenth century until the French conquest in 1912.
46. El Malki, Le Maghreb conomique: est-il encore possible?, 200 LAMALIF 52, 56
(1988).
47. Belaid, supra note 5, at 497.
48. Id. at 496.
49. Brunot, Le Maghreb et la communaut europ~enne, L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE
MODERNES 52, 60 (Fall 1989). Morocco even offered to allow a United States (U.S.) military
air base on its territory. Ghiles, Algeria Forges a Fragile Maghreb Union, Financial Times,
Feb. 16, 1988, at 3. Algeria generally prefers isolation but must maintain relations with the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), who has supplied Algeria with armaments
since Algeria's independence. The U.S.S.R. is also Libya's main arms supplier. Id.; Bamford,
Proprietary to the United Press International (Oct. 6, 1988) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file)
(a.m. cycle); Dick, Algeria Ponders Libyan Union after Qaddafi-Hassan Break, Reuters
North European Service (Sept. 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Omni file).
50. King Hasan of Morocco addresses news conference at the end of the Maghreb sum-
mit in Marrakesh, British Broadcasting Corporation (Feb. 21, 1989).
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/. Algeria.-Following independence on July 5, 1962,51 Alge-
ria has been dominated by one exclusive political party, the National
Liberation Front (FLN). 52 The FLN solely controlled a highly cen-
tralized, socialist government 53 until the Constitution was revised on
February 28, 1989, 54 due to mounting internal pressure for political
reform.15 This revised Constitution no longer refers to the political
monopoly of the FLN and permits multipartism, though ambigu-
ously and with potentially significant restraints.5 The Constitution
51. BACKGROUND NOTES: ALGERIA, supra note 44, at 1.
52. Leca, Le syst'me politique algbrien (1965-1981), in LE GRAND MAGHREB 6-7 (A.
Claisse & G. Conac eds. 1988). The FLN adopted the National Charter in 1976 which em-
bodies the Party's principles. These principles are. largely laid out in the subsequently adopted
Constitution of November 19, 1976. Membership to the Party is done through a rigorous selec-
tion process which the Party implements. Therefore, Party membership is exclusive. The Na-
tional Charter with specific membership requirements has been reproduced in M. CAMAU.
POUVOIR ET INSTITUTIONS AU MAGHREB 249-50 (1978). In sum, a candidate must demon-
strate his adherence to socialism. Id. at 145. Interestingly, the Constitution of November 19,
1976, was to be interpreted in accordance with the National Charter. In addition, the National
Charter was the fundamental source of the policy of the nation and the laws of the state.
ALGERIAN CONST. of November 19, 1976, art. 6, reprinted in Cubertafond, La constitution
alg'rienne du 28fevrier 1989, REVUE JURIDIQUE ET POLITIQUE, INDtPENDANCE ET COOPtRA-
TION 39, 43, n.12 (1990).
53. Moatassime, Dimension culturelle et g'opolitique de l'intbgration maghrbbine, in
LE GRAND MAGHREB 237, 238 (A. Claisse & G. Conac eds. 1988). Article 10 of the Constitu-
tion of November 19, 1976 declared socialism as the only means of achieving national indepen-
dence. Article 10 is reprinted in Cubertafond, supra note 52, at 43, n.12.
The former political platform of the FLN is summarized:
I. (a)The FLN nominates the presidential candidates and the people thereafter
elect the President by direct universal suffrage.
(b)The FLN nominates the candidates for the Popular National Assem-
bly which the people therafter elect by direct universal suffrage.
2. The State's power is unified and there must be political unity between all
branches and institutions of the State - that is the Assembly, government,
President and Judges.
3. Organizations formed by the people must follow the political platform of the
FLN.
Leca, supra note 52, at 6-7.
54. The revision of the Constitution was approved overwhelmingly by national referen-
dum on February 23, 1989. Cubertafond, supra note 52, at 39, note 1.
This Constitution is the third since Algeria gained its independence. The first Constitution
was adopted on September 10, 1963, and was repealed in 1965 after a coup d'etat resulting in
strongman Colonel Boumediene taking power. The second Constitution was adopted on No-
vember 19, 1976, and it provided the framework for the present Constitution. Bendouron, La
nouvelle constitution alg&rienne du 28fevrier 1989, REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCI-
ENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'tTRANGER 1305, 1305-06, n.2 (1989).
55. Garcon, La vie politique algbrienne: bouleversements aprbs 25 ans d'immobilisme,
L'TAT DU MAGHREB 383, 386 (1991).
56. Cubertafond, supra note 52, at 43.
The Constitution recognizes the "right to establish associations of a political character."
ALGERIAN CONST. art. 40, 1 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 43 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds.
1990). Therefore, the Constitution does not expressly guarantee the right to form political
parties. Cubertafond, supra note 52, at 43, note 45. This interpretation becomes more appar-
ent based on former Algerian president Chadli Bendjedid's speech at the FLN Congress: "A
party which is not founded on solid bases cannot qualify as a political party, but is more an
association or group while it is not present in all the areas of the whole of the wilayas (dis-
tricts) of the country." Moreover, Bendjedid stated that the phrase "associations of a political
character" was used in order to permit political groups to join the FLN in the future without
in the meantime outlawing the formation of political parties outside the FLN. Bendourou,
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makes no reference to socialism, which prevailed as the only form of
government in the prior two constitutions." Nevertheless, the Con-
stitution creates a democratic republic in which the executive exer-
cises considerable influence over the legislature and judiciary,58 and
possesses discretion to take any measures during a "compelling ne-
cessity."' 59 The Constitution, adopted only eleven days after the sign-
ing of the Arab Maghreb Union Treaty, declares Algeria to be an
"integral part of the Great Maghreb country." 60
However, these so-called reforms in the Constitution have come
too late. On June 12, 1990, the majority of Algerians voted in mu-
nicipal elections for the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS), a radical political party which represents the people's frustra-
tion with the FLN.61 Furthermore, on December 26, 1991, the FIS
unexpectedly won 188 of 231 seats available during the first round of
parliamentary elections. The second and final round of parliamen-
tary elections, with an additional 200 seats at stake, were scheduled
for January 16, 1992.62 This round would have undoubtedly given
the FIS the political clout needed to change the Constitution.6"
supra note 54, at 1315, n.22.
Further ambiguous restraints on political associations are that they "may not be invoked
atgainst fundamental liberties, national unity, territorial integrity, the independence of the
country and the sovereignty of the people." ALGERIAN CONST. art. 40. These political associa-
tions may fall under the purview of Article 8 (institutions established by the people must, inter
alia, safeguard the national independence, identity, and unity) since the phrase "institutions
established by the people" is so general in meaning. In addition, the institutions may not, inter
alia, engage in "practices contrary to Islamic morals and the values of November." ALGERIAN
CONST. art. 9. See generally Cubertafond, supra note 52, at 45-49 discussing these potential
pitfalls and those posed by three laws concerning political parties passed pursuant to Article
40.
57. See Cubertafond, supra note 52, at 43, n.12 for the articles of the previous constitu-
tions requiring socialism.
58. See generally Cubertafond, supra note 52, at 50-58 for a critique of the executive's
powers within the Constitution.
59. Id. at 54; CONST. art. 86. The President may also take exceptional measures with
the consent of the High Council of Security and the Council of Ministers when the country's
institutions are threatened by imminent danger. Id. art. 87. In addition, the President unilater-
ally declares war, in which case the Constitution is suspended. Id. arts. 89-90.
60. ALGERIAN CONST. Preamble.
61. Ibrahim, Algeria's Leader Quits, Citing Fear of Political Chaos, N.Y. Times, Jan.
12, 1992, at I, col. 6; 10, col. 3; Ramonet, Alg~rie: dernikre chance avant le chaos, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Dec. 1991, at 12, col. 1. The FIS is supported financially by Saudi Arabia.
Ramonet, supra note 61, at 12, col. 3.
The people rally around the FIS simply out of disdain for the FLN. The FIS does not
uphold democratic ideals and beleives that an election should only continue until it has
achieved full power in Algeria. The FIS will thereafter impose single party rule. At present,
the FIS has not made public any social or economic programs. The FIS will only hold a party
congress to discuss such matters after an Islamic State has been proclaimed. Addi, Algirie: le
d'rapage, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Feb. 1992, at 1, col. 4; 20, col. I. The FIS' slogan is:
"No Constitution and no laws. The only rule is the Koran and the law of God." Ibrahim,
Algerian Election Tests Government: Parliamentary Voting Is Seen as a Challenge to Appeal
of Islamic Militants, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1991, at 3, col. I.
62. Ibrahim, supra, note 61, at 10, col. 4.
63. The FIS would also have to gain control of the presidency in the elections scheduled
for December 1993.
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Faced with such a drastic outcome, the army cancelled the elections,
annuled the results of the first round, and had President Chadli
Benjedid resign."' A High State Committee has assumed Benjedid's
duties for the remainder of his term (until December 1993),15 and
the FIS has been outlawed."6
2. Tunisia.-The political ideology of Tunisia is cornered be-
tween two competing philosophies: absolutism and liberal reform-
ism.67 Embodying this political ideology, the Destourian Socialist
Party 8 led the quest for independence from France.69
After independence in 1956, Tunisia adopted a Constitution on
June 1, 1959.70 Similar to Algeria, the Tunisian Constitution de-
clares Tunisia as part of the Great Arab Maghreb.7 1 The Constitu-
tion forms a government based on'the French model, but embodies
both the remnants of the powers of the pre-colonial monarch and the
The Constitution may be amended in two ways. First, the president submits the amend-
ment for legislative approval (presumably by a simple majority) and the amendment is there-
after voted by referendum. ALGERIAN CONST. art. 163. Second, the president may promulgate
the amendment if he obtains a three-fourths supermajority vote on the amendment by the
legislature and a concurring opinion by the Constitutional Council (though it is not apparent if
this opinion is controlling). Id. art. 164.
64. Addi, supra note 61, at 20, col. I; Ibrahim, Algeria Arrests a Senior Islamic
Leader, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1992, at A3, col. 4.
65. Addi, supra note 61, at 20, col. 1; Fundamentalist Leaders Reported Arrested in
Algeria, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1992, at A3, col. 3.
66. Algirie: un mort 6 constantine lors de heurts entre islamistes et policiers, LE
MONE, March 8-9, 1992, at 5, col. 1.
67. Chaker, L' volution constitutionnelle et politique de la tunisie, in LE GRAND
MAGHREB 86, 88 (A. Claisse & G. Conac eds. 1988). The history of government in Tunisia
reflects stability and moderation. The progression of government in Tunisia has not always
been constant; it has been marked with periods of change and periods of digressions. This
history may be traced to the time prior to the French extension of a protectorate over Tunisia
in 1883.
Before 1883, Tunisia, though under the influence of the Ottoman Empire, nevertheless,
possessed much autonomy. Under local rule by the Bey, a Constitution was adopted in 1861,
which served to limit the Bey's power and provided for a separation of powers. Id. at 87. The
period from this time until French intervention was marked by a movement to align the state
with liberal constitutionalism. M. CAMAU, supra note 52, at 27.
Although in reality, the Bey still possessed absolute power, continual pressure by reform-
ers created a political ideology in Tunisian based on the necessity to reform the state. In 1864
there was a revolt in Tunisia. In order to suppress it, the Bey suspended the application of the
constitution. Id. at 29. During the period of the French protectorate, Tunisia promulgated
another constitution and became attached to western liberal reform of the state. Id. at 31.
68. This political. party evolved from the Young Tunisian Movement, the founders of
Tunisian nationalism in the early 1900s. M. CAMAU, supra note 52, at 30. The nationalist
Young Tunisian Movement was thereafter continued in 1920 by the Destour. Id. at 32-33. The
Destour was followed by the N~o-Destour in 1934. Id. at 37. This party then became the
Destourian Socialist Party in 1964. Id. at 41. The leader of this party, then and up until very
recently, was Habib Bourguiba. Id. The present President of Tunisia is Zine el Abidine Ben
Ali.
69. Id. at 41.
70. Id.
71. TUNISIAN CONST. art. 2, reprinted in Historical Constitutions Vol., CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1971).
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inspirations of political reform. 7' The result is a presidential repub-
lic 73 that minimally allows for multipartism.74
3. Morocco.-In the face of French intervention, the National
Movement was formed to reinstate Morocco's independence. 75 The
National Movement knew that in order to gain the support of the
Moroccan people, it had to emphasize the monarch as a symbol and
factor of the traditional unifying force in Morocco.7 In addition, the
National Movement had to incorporate a policy stressing a new so-
cial equilibrium, due to the strong influence of Muslim reformists
and the traditional bourgeoisie. 77 Thus, Morocco was to emerge in-
dependent as a result of an ideology based on the necessity of a mon-
72. Chaker, supra note 67, at 88. Evidencing reform, the Constitution espouses signifi-
cant principles of human rights. TUNISIAN CONST. arts. 5-17. The Constitution proclaims Tuni-
sia to be an independent, sovereign republic of the Islamic faith and Arabic language. Id. art.
1.
Election of public officials is by "universal, free, direct and secret suffrage." Id. arts. 19,
39. Articles 19 and 39 concern the National Assembly and president respectively. However,
electoral law determines the procedures and conditions for elections. The principle of separa-
tion of powers has been incorporated into the Constitution. Article 28 declares that the Na-
tional Assembly exercises the legislative power. Executive power is carried out by the Presi-
dent. Id. art. 37. Judicial authority is independent and the magistrates are not subject to any
authority other than the law. Id. art., 65.
The President, who is elected for renewable five year terms, is both the head of state,
government and the army. Id. arts. 38-39, 44, 50-51 (the President appoints the Prime Minis-
ter and presides over the Council of Ministers. In addition, the President may terminate gov-
ernmental functions at will.).
During times of crises, the President may unilaterally take necessary measures. Id. art.
46. Crisis is referred to as imminent peril. This term is not defined, nor has anyone or anything
been named to determine when an imminent peril is taking place. Thus, it may be assumed
that the President exercises his discretion in this area. In addition, former President Bourguiba
was granted an exception from the presidential electoral requirement and proclaimed president
for life. Id. art. 39.
The unicameral National Assembly, invested with legislative powers, does have the au-
thority to censure the government and may dissolve the government upon a two-third vote. Id.
art. 62. However, in this event, the President may dissolve the National Assembly thereafter,
and call for new elections. Should the newly elected National Assembly again dissolve the
government for the same reasons as those of its predecessor, the President must then resign.
Id. art. 63.
73. Chaker, supra note 67, at 89.
74. Concerning political parties, the main player is the Destourian Socialist Party. Al-
though pluralism has been recently allowed, these opposition parties have little influence due to
the state's periodic repressions of the parties and limitations on free speech, and the parties'
lack of funds to hold mandatory national congresses. Id. at 108-10. In addition, the opposition
political parties must apply to the Minister of the Interior in order to be officially recognized.
Id. at 108. Moreover, the dominant groups in Tunisian society do not favor pluralism. Id. at
11. Thus, it may be concluded that pluralism does not exist and will not develop in Tunisia
for some time. Id. at 115. Despite this fact, the stability of the Tunisian state appears strong.
See id. inferring that the Army favors a one party system comprised of the 'Destourian Social-
ist Party. The Army has always been instrumental in preserving the state. Id.
75. M. CAMAU, supra note 52, at 71. During the nineteenth century, the Sultan of Mo-
rocco was viewed in his country as both the descendent of the Prophet Mohammed, thereby
invested with spiritual authority, and also as the leader of the Muslim community, possessing
vested political authority. Id. at 70.
76. Id. at 72.
77. Id.
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archy and on the need for social reform. 8
This political liberalism mixed with a monarchy79 is best evi-
denced by the Constitution of March 10, 1972, which guarantees
political pluralism in the monocameral Chamber of Representa-
tives, 80 and which grants the people basic rights and freedoms. 8'
Though the Constitution provides for a quasi-democratic regime, the
King still controls in virtually all facets. 82
Concerning Morocco within the Maghreb, the Constitution pro-
claims Morocco to be a Muslim State that is part of the Great
Maghreb.8" Furthermore, as an African State, Morocco avows to aid
African unity.84
4. Mauritania.-Mauritania emerged as an independent state
on November 28, 1960, without any apparent resistance from
France.85 The Mauritanian Constitution of May 20, 1961, purported
78. Id.
79. The King is the leader of the Muslim faith and guarantor of the state. MOROCCAN
CONST. art. 19, reprinted in II CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds.
1971). The King is sacred and inviolable. Id. art. 23. The King also assures the territorial
integrity of the state, there included the Western Sahara. Id. art. 19. See infra note 114 Jis-
cussing the Moroccan view on sovereignty over the Western Sahara.
The King appoints all members of the government, there included the Prime Minister.
MOROCCAN CONST. art. 59. The King may also dissolve the Legislative Chamber of Repre-
sentatives (Chamber). Id. art. 70. In addition to general executive powers, the King also may
suspend the Constitution's application in time of a national emergency. Id. art. 35. However,
this may last for only thirty days unless the Chamber permits its continuance. Id. art. 48.
The King appoints the members of the judiciary. Id. arts. 33, 78. Exceptions to this gen-
eral grant of authority involve the High Court and the Supreme Court where judges are
elected or appointed for terms. Id. arts. 86, 95. The judiciary is independent of the legislative
and executive branches. Id. art. 76. Judges may not be removed. Id. art. 79. The Supreme
Court, in addition to other duties, resolves conflicts between the government and the Chamber
when the Chamber has allegedly overstepped its constitutional grants of authority. Id. art. 52.
80. Pursuant to the Constitution, there must be political pluralism. MOROCCAN CONST.
art. 3. There is a significant diversity of political parties in Morocco. For a description of their
political orientations, see Rousset, Le systbme politique du maroc, LE GRAND MAGHREB 52,
60-62 (A. Claisse & G. Conac eds. 1988).
In addition, two-thirds of the monocameral Chamber is elected by direct, universal suf-
frage. MOROCCAN CONST. art. 43. The other one-third of the Chamber is elected by an electo-
ral college. Id. art. 43. Nevertheless, a member of the Chamber may be arrested if his views
challenge the monarchy or the Muslim faith, or are disrespectful to the King. Id. art. 37.
Moreover, the Chamber is granted limited legislative powers. Id. arts. 45, 49-50. However, the
Chamber may dissolve the government upon a majority vote. Id. art. 75. All members of the
Chamber are elected on the basis of proportional representation of the different groups.
81. MOROCCAN CONST. arts. 5, 8-15. However, many rights may be restricted by law.
See id. art. 9. In addition, citizens must contribute to the defense of the country and to reve-
nue raising. Id. arts. 16-18.
82. Rousset, supra note 80, at 70. Unrest in Morocco has precipitated from a lack of
total democratization and decentralization. In 1981 and 1984, there were outbursts and unrest
due to Morocco's economic difficulties. Id. at 70. Opposition political parties are progressively
gaining more representation in the Chamber. Id. Without further reform, the people will lose
confidence in the ability of the state to adequately resolve the nation's difficulties, The major
unifying force, however, remains the will to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation,
there included the Western Sahara. Id. The Western Sahara is discussed at infra note 114.
83. MOROCCAN CONST. Preamble. Arabic is proclaimed the official language.
84. Id.
85. Marchesin, L' volution politique et constitutionnelle de la mauritania, in LE GRAND
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to impose a system of separation of powers. In reality, it formed a
government in which the President reigned in an oligarchy. 6 The
National Assembly's legislative powers were de facto abolished. 7
The President controlled the state without any possible opposition
from either the National Assembly or the judiciary. 88
This political system continued until July 10, 1978, when the
military successfully staged a coup d'btat,8 precipitated by Maurita-
nia's lack of effectiveness in the Western Sahara.90 The Constitution
of May 20, 1961, was replaced by successive charters following five
further military coup d'tats in six years.91
The present military regime in Mauritania is the Military Com-
mittee of National Salvation (CMSN), which took power on Decem-
ber 12, 1984, under the leadership of Colonel Maaouya ould Taya.92
Under this regime, the Constitutional Charter of February 9, 1985,
was promulgated.9 3
The Charter's preamble stresses the attachment of the state to
Islam-it is the religion of the state and of the people; also, the only
source of law is the sharia.94 Furthermore, the Charter expresses an
MAGHREB 73, 75 (A. Claisse & G. Conac eds. 1988).
86. Id. at 78, 81. The President was nevertheless elected for five year terms. Id. at 77.
87. Id. at 77.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 78. The takeover was precipitated by Mauritania's costly military intervention
in the Western Sahara and lack of success against the Polisario Front. C. BELVAUDE, supra
note 10, at 36-37.
90. Upon Spain's withdrawal from the Western Sahara in 1975, Mauritania laid claims
to parts of the Western Sahara. However, Mauritanian forces were defeated in 1978 by an
indigenous guerilla group, seeking independence for the Western Sahara, called the Polisario
Front. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE. BACKGROUND NOTES: MOROCCO 6
(1989) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES: MOROCCO].
In Mauritania, the Military Committee of National Reconstruction ended hostilities in
the Western Sahara and avowed to save the country from ruin and dissolution, stressing the
necessity of safeguarding the national unity and of defending the State's existence. C.
BELVAUDE, supra note 10, at 37-38.
91. Marchesin, supra note 85, at 79, 81.
92. Id. at 81.
93. Mauritanian Charter, reprinted in 10 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustein
& G. Franz eds. 1971). The Charter expressly rejects the Constitution of May 20, 1961. Id.
art. 1.
Mauritanian politics have continuously been dominated by the descendants of the Moors
who were of nobility. Marchesin, supra note 85, at 81. The society is divided by a caste system
in which the lower levels are exploited by the nobility. The nobility possesses the power and
does little work, while the poor have nothing and work diligently. Id. at 83. These social
problems have created unrest. Id. Mauritania is comprised of a significant black population
and racial problems continue to exist. Black leaders are not adequately included in the mem-
bership of the Military Commitee of National Salvation (CMSN). Id.
94. Mauritanian Charter preamble. The sharia is Islamic law. BACKGROUND NOTES:
LIBYA, supra note 40, at 4. The sharia represents all the rules found in the Koran and in the
tradition of the Prophet Mohammed. These rules guide individuals in all aspects of their daily
lives. Actions are judged under the sharia as right or wrong based on principles of truth and
justice. These principles are found in the Koran and the Prophet's tradition relating to reli-
gious rites, individual and community morals, and legal rights and obligations (on which the
Koran supplies many rules relating to the position of individuals and material wealth in society
and criminal penalties). Botiveau, La charia islamique, L'tTAT DU MAGHREB 3511 (1991).
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adherence to human rights. 95 Nevertheless, although political parties
are banned, the country continues to be ruled by the military govern-
ment of Colonel Maaouya ould Taya,9 6 and all power remains exclu-
sively within the CMSN.97
5. Libya.-Libya emerged upon its independence in 1951 as
an independent, federal state under the rule of King Idriss.98 Under
this regime, Libya fell again in the Western sphere due to the dis-
covery of oil and the permittance of American and British military
bases."' In order to resist Western imposed economic dependence,100
Colonel Qaddafi overthrew the monarchy in 1969 and created a new
revolutionary government.101
Following an evolution of political philosophy, the Declaration
on the Establishment of the Authority of the People (Declaration)
was adopted as a National Charter on March 2, 1977.202 The Decla-
ration's preamble, denouncing traditional norms of government, 10 3
espoused the establishment of a direct democratic system'01 tied to
socialism and Islam."0 5 In addition, the Koran was declared as the
95. Mauritanian Charter preamble. Interesting to note that slavery was abolished for
the third time in 1980. C. BELVAUDE, supra note 10, at 45.
96. BACKGROUND NOTES: MAURITANIA, supra note 43, at 4.
97. Pursuant to the Charter, the CMSN exercises executive power and controls the
government and the military. Mauritanian Charters arts. 2, 3. In addition, the CMSN ap-
points the President, and retains the power to impeach the President. Id., arts. 4, 10. The
President is the head of state. Id., art. 9. The CMSN selects its own membership. Id., art. 5.
Thus, the charter invests the CMSN with sole power and any semblance of democracy has
been extinguished.
Nevertheless, the Charter does provide some hope for democracy, stating that: "The pre-
sent Charter will remain in force until the construction of democratic institutions." Id., art.
147. Recent steps taken toward this realization are evidenced by mayoral elections in 1986 and
regional elections in 1988. C. BELVAUDE, supra note 10, at 40. Though minimal, these elec-
tions do give hope to the possibility of more significant decentralization. Id.
98. Bleuchot & Monastiri, Le systbme politique de la Libye, in LE GRAND MAGHREB
41-42 (A. Claisse & G. Conac eds. 1988) [hereinafter Bleuchot]. Due to separatist pressure,
federalism was abandoned and the territory was divided into several smaller governmental
entities.'Id. at 42-43.
99. Id. at 43. During World War II, Libya was occupied by Allied forces. Id. at 41.
100. Libyans began to embrace Colonel Nasser's demands that Arabs find their inde-
pendence and dignity by resisting colonialism, capitalism, and western zionism, and by adopt-
ing socialism. Id. at 43-44. Petroleum exploitation created an economic dependence on the
West due to the oil companies' introduction into Libya of capitalist consumption. This was
viewed as a continuation of Italian colonialism. Id. at 43.
101. Id. at 44. The revolutionaries had the installation of democracy and socialism for a
goal. However, they had not formulated a plan for recreating the society. Thus, the Libyan
revolution was not to really happen until several years after the coup d'&tat. J. DAVIS, supra
note 40, at 31-32, 34.
102. Bleuchot, supra note 98, at 47.
103. These denounced norms include government by the "individual, family, tribe, sect,
class, representative, party, or group of parties." LIBYAN DECLAR. Preamble, reprinted in 9
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustein & G. Franz eds. 1971).
104. Qaddafi believes that representation necessarily involves domination of the people
by a few. Qaddafi places much emphasis on personal sovereignty. J. DAVIS, supra note 40, at
19-20.
105. LIBYAN DECLAR. Preamble.
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Constitution of Libya,' and the sharia became the controlling
source of law." °7 The Declaration formed people's committees and
congresses, 10 8 but it did not provide for a head of state, a government
or ministers since the people are the purported rulers.'0 9
In practice, however, Colonel Qaddafi has possessed absolute
political power in Libya as leader of the Revolutionary Commit-
tee.110 Colonel Qaddafi has been consistently willing to dissolve the
Libyan State in order to unite with fellow Arab States."' He is an
adamant supporter of a more significant integration of the Arab
Maghreb Union on political, economic, and social levels." 2
6. Maghreb Union.-Thus, the Maghrebine Countries have
evolved into individual nation-states who possess governments which
are, for the most part, highly centralized and exclusive. Neverthe-
less, each government is very different, ranging from: a monarchy in
Morocco allowing political pluralism; to a presidential, republican
government in Tunisia permitting minimal pluralism; to a highly
centralized, single party government in Algeria on the verge of polit-
ical chaos; to a military government in Mauritania; and to a socialist
dictatorship in Libya. In addition, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tuni-
sia maintain close relations with the West, while Algeria and Libya
prefer the former U.S.S.R.
This diversity of governments with differing political ideologies
will certainly hinder the possibilities of a political union, and it also
will affect any form of economic cooperation."' Recent present-day
examples of the clash between these differing political ideologies are
the emotional Western Sahara dispute between Morocco and the
Polisario Front (supported by Algeria and Libya);" the Iraqi inva-
106. Id. art. 2. However, the Koran provides little insight as to how a state should func-
tion and barely addresses political issues. Bleuchot, supra note 98, at 49.
107. Prior to 1969, Libya possessed two court systems: civil and Islamic. Now all civil
laws must conform to the sharia. BACKGROUND NOTES: LIBYA, supra note 40, at 4. See supra
note 94 defining sharia.
108. LIBYAN DECLAR. art. 3.
109. Bleuchot, supra note 98, at 50.
110. Id.; BACKGROUND NOTES: LIBYA, supra note 40, at 4. It must be stressed that the
Declaration does not invest this power in Colonel Qaddafi nor in the Revolutionary Committee.
Qaddafi legitimizes his power from his capacity as guide of the revolution. Bleuchot, supra
note 98, at 48. The Declaration forms a system which almost resembles libertarian anarchy.
Id. at 50. This analogy parallels Qaddafi's belief that states must be abolished since they
oppress the people. J. DAVIS, supra note 40, at 19-20.
111. R. LEMARCHAND. THE GREEN AND THE BLACK 106 (1988). Colonel Qaddafi be-
lieves that colonial boundaries must be abolished since they hinder the success of Pan-Arab-
ism. Id.
112. Nexis: The Perth Corp., Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, Feb. 20, 1989, at 4
(Vol. XV, no. 7, number 320, 3rd series).
113. Belaid, supra note 5, at 496.
114. However, Algeria reported that it has stopped supporting the Polisario Front, and
Libya is believed to have followed suit. Algerian Paper Blames Morocco for Sahara Fighting,
The Reuters Library Report (Nov. 18, 1989) (LEXis, Nexis library, Omni file); Hughes, North
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sion of Kuwait (causing much discord within the Arab Maghreb
Union due to the irreconcilable positions of its members);" 5 and the
bitter border struggle between Mauritania and Senegal (allegedly
supported by Morocco)."'
Despite each Maghrebine State's purported willingness to
merge its State with others in order to create a unified Maghreb, the
Maghrebine States opt for guarding their national sovereignties.1 7
Hence, a Maghrebine unity can only be formed based upon the co-
operation of existing states, and this unity can only be realized pro-
gressively."" Faced with such a disparity in political ideologies, the
African Foreign Ministers Discuss Maghreb Integration, The Reuters Library Report (Oct.
30, 1989) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file); British Boat Destroyed by Guerrillas, Reuters
North European Service (Jan. 14, 1987) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file).
The Western Sahara, comprised of 267,028 square miles of wasteland and desert, was a
Spanish territory from 1884 until 1976. However, in 1975 Morocco occupied the northern two-
thirds of the territory, Mauritania the southern one-third. In 1979 upon Mauritania's with-
drawal from the Western Sahara, Morocco laid claim to all the territory. Morocco's claim to
sovereignty, based on its historical ties with the territory, were refuted by the International
Court of Justice in an opinion in 1975 I.C.J. Reports.
The Polisario Front emerged as an indigenous guerrilla group to first evict the Spaniards,
and then to continue against the Moroccans. Damis, The Western Sahara Dispute as a Source
of Regional Conflict in North Africa, in CONTEMPORARY NORTH AFRICA: ISSUES OF DEVEL-
OPMENT AND INTEGRATION 138-39 (H. Barakat ed. 1985); BACKGROUND NOTES: MOROCCO,
supra note 90, at 6. Seeking peace within Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
opted for a referendum in the territory on self-determination. 17 Resolutions on decoloniza-
tion; UN General Assembly, 20 UN CHRONICLE 19 (Jan. 1983). When the OAU seated a
delegate from the Sahara Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR), the purported government of
the Polisario, Morocco immediately withdrew from the OAU and the referendum never took
place. BACKGROUND NOTES: MOROCCO, supra note 90, at 6.
Finally, on June 27, 1990, the UN Security Council adopted a plan for the supervision of
a ceasefire and the effectuation of the referendum. The referendum is to be administered by a
UN Mission within thirty-five weeks. Security Council approves UN plan for Western Sahara,
27:3 UN CHRONICLE 12 (Sept. 1990).
Morocco's arch-enemy during its struggle with the Polisario has always been Algeria,
which supports self-determination in the Western Sahara. In addition, Algeria provides weap-
ons and shelter for the Polisario across the border in Algeria. Nevertheless, the leaders of
Morocco and Algeria met in 1988 and resolved to set aside, for the time being, their differ-
ences over the Western Sahara in order to cooperate with each other so that a Maghrebine
Union may be achieved. Daoud, La crbation de I'Union du Maghreb arabe, MAGHREB
MACHREK: MONDE ARABE 120, 122-23 (April-June 1989). Thus, nothing has been resolved and
the question of the Western Sahara will continue to plague Moroccan relations with Algeria
and Libya in the years to come.
115. Though all the Maghrebine Countries supported an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait
and an Arab role in solving the crisis, Shehadi, Maghreb States Seek Common Ground on
Gulf Crisis, The Reuters Library Report (Sept. 2, 1990) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file),
each country went its own way with respect to how to bring about the withdrawal. At an
emergency Arab summit held on August 10, 1990, Morocco was in favor of sending troops to
Saudi Arabia, Libya was adamantly against it, Algeria abstained from voting, Mauritania
merely expressed reservation, and Tunisia did not even bother to attend. Zhurun, News Analy-
sis: Gulf Crisis Ruins Prospects of Arab Economic Integration, The Xinhua General Overseas
News Service (Sept. 2, 1990) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file). In the end, Morocco sent
5,000 troops to the Middle East. Algerian Prime Minister in Morocco for Cooperation Talks,
The Reuters Library Report (Jan. 7, 1991) (LEXiS, Nexis library, Omni file).
116. Murphy, supra note 3, at 4.
117. Claisse, Les systbmes de Ibgitimit4 & l'preuve, le cas des pays du Maghreb, in LE
GRAND MAGHREB 119, 145 (A Claisse & G. Conac eds. 1988). Mauritania's willingness to
dissolve itself is inferred from its participation in the Arab Maghreb Union.
118. Id. Since the Magrebine States will not undergo an immediate political, economic,
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Arab Maghreb Union's only hope to achieve any sort of unity must
first begin with economic cooperation. 119
C. Economic Analysis
Economic cooperation between the Maghrebine Countries has
been minimal,12 and trade between the Maghrebine Countries has
averaged only $200 million per year. 21 This amount of intra-re-
gional trade merely accounts for 3% of the total trade of the
Maghreb, which conducts more than 60% of its total trade with the
EEC. 22 Nevertheless, increased trade within the Arab Maghreb
Union is anticipated due to the comparative advantages 23 of the
Maghrebine Countries. 2 " Understood within the Maghreb is that to
meet the challenges posed by today's world, national economies are
ineffective and the Maghrebine Countries must act together, as one
unified block.'25 Only as a united entity will the Maghrebine States
best be able to guard the preferential trade concessions granted to
them by the EEC and the United States. By being unified, the
Maghrebine Countries will also be able to pressure for even further
advantageous concessions. 2 6
Algeria is the largest of the Maghrebine Countries, possessing
2.4 million square kilometers of territory,2 7 23.9 million people128
and social merger, any sort of unity must be accomplished by the existing states progressively
negotiating and comprising amongst themselves. As demonstrated by the EEC, a closer unity
based on the already existing Member States will be accomplished by successive and more
serious agreements leading to further integration and ultimately, perhaps, to a complete union.
The EEC is achieving political unity slowly since the EEC Member States are only willing to
give up small portions of their political sovereignty at a time.
119. Id. at 146; J. VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 92-93 (1961).
120. Belaid, supra note 5, at 496.
121. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE. FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES: MOROCCO 9 (1990) [hereinafter FET: MOROCCO].
122. Murphy, supra note 3, at 4.
123. Comparative advantage is a term to describe the notion that since each country of
the world possesses various resources (different factor endowments), each country should spe-
cialize in the production of an item which it can produce more efficiently and cheaply than
another country could. With each country specialized as such, there exists a basis for trade. C.
KINDLEBERGER. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 17-21, 27, 33 (5th ed. 1972), reprinted in J.
JACKSON & W. DAVEY. LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS; CASES,
MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 11-15 (2nd ed. 1986) [hereinafter W. DAVEY].
124. FET: MOROCCO, supra note 121, at 9. Cooperation in economic development
within the Maghreb would yield enormous rewards. Ruedy, Historical Influences on Intra-
Regional Relations in the Maghrib, in CONTEMPORARY NORTH AFRICA: ISSUES OF DEVELOP-
MENT AND INTEGRATION 87, 96 (H. Barakat ed. 1985).
125. Belaid, supra note 5, at 497-98. Challenges facing the Maghreb are continued pop-
ulation growth, demographics, food, technology, international competition, and relations with
economic blocs.
126. See infra notes 256-89 and accompanying text discussing the granted tarde prefer-
ences and how easily they may be revoked.
127. BACKGROUND NOTES: ALGERIA, supra note 44, at I.
128. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES: ALGERIA 2 (1989) [hereinafter FET: ALGERIA 2]. These are 1988
estimated figures.
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and a gross domestic product (GDP) estimated at only $11 billion.
This low GDP translates into a per capita income of $770 with a
labor force of 5 million people and an unemployment rate of
21.8% .129 Hydrocarbon production comprises. 75% of the GDP, and
a staggering 96% of export revenues.' Though Algerian crude oil
is expected to run dry by the beginning of the next century,' 3 ' Alge-
ria still possesses the fourth largest known natural gas reserves in the
world.1 32
In 1987 Algerian trade with the EEC amounted to nearly $6
billion in exports, consisting mostly of hydrocarbons. 3 Algeria im-
ported nearly $5.5 billion from the EEC, which included machinery,
electrical equipment, and foodstuffs.134 In 1988 Algerian exports to
the United States were $2.6 billion, which was virtually all hydrocar-
bons, while Algerian imports from the United States amounted to
less than $9.5 million with the principal import being foodstuffs. 135
Libya is the next largest Maghrebine Country territorially with
nearly 2 million square kilometers but only 4 million people. 33 Nev-
ertheless, the GDP was over $20 billion, with $5,500 as the highest
annual per capita income in the Maghreb.13 7 Libyan exports to the
EEC amounted to $6.3 billion, almost exclusively hydrocarbons,
while Libyan imports from the EEC reached $3.3 billion and cov-
ered machinery, electrical equipment, iron, steel, hydrocarbons, and
foodstuffs.138 Libya did not trade with the United States in 1990.13
Libya's economy is wholly dependent upon revenues from ex-
ported crude oil. These revenues decreased from $23 billion in 1980
129. Id. at 2. These are 1988 estimated figures. The GDP and per capita income figures,
if computed according to the official exchange rate, would be inflated to $51 billion and $2,150
respectively. However, the official exchange rate is overstated, and the $11 billion and $770
figures more accurately reflect the true purchasing power. Id. at 4-5.
130. Id. at 5; BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS, The Maghreb: Algeria, The Reuters Li-
brary Report (Dec. 4, 1989) (LExIs, Nexis library, Omni file). Hydrocarbon production in-
cludes natural gas (e.g., ethane, propoane, and butane), fuel oils, and crude petroleum.
131. Harris, Europe and North Africa: Conflict and Opportunity, ARAB AFFAIRS 78, 86
(1988-89).
132. The largest known natural gas reserves are in the U.S.S.R., Iran, and the U.S.
BACKGROUND NOTES: ALGERIA, supra note 44, at 6. Algeria is one of the three largest natural
gas suppliers to the E.C. No Quotas for Outsiders, Cunha tells U.S. Gas Group, 1992 - 3:2
THE EXTERNAL IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION, Feb. 9, 1990, at 3.
133. EUROPEAN COMMUNITES EUROSTAT: EXTERNAL TRADE 83 (1990) [hereinafter
EUROSTAT]. These 1988 figures were converted to U.S. dollars using the following excahnge
rate: I ECU = $1.2 USD.
134. EUROSTAT, supra note 133, at 91.
135. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS 13, 17, 234, 235
(1990) [hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE]. 1990 statistics.
136. BACKGROUND NOTES: LIBYA, supra note 40, at 1. 1988 figures.
137. Id. 1986 figures.
138. EUROSTAT, supra note 133, at 85, 95.
139. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 135, at 13, 17. This situation is due to a
total ban on trade with Libya imposed by President Reagan in 1986. BACKGROUND NOTES:
LIBYA, supra note 40, at 5.
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to $6 billion in 1988.140 Economic woes in Libya can only be ex-
pected to increase since its oil reserves are anticipated to dry up
early in the twenty-first century;" 1 furthermore, Libya must import
65% of its food. 42
Mauritania is the poorest of the Maghrebine Countries. It pos-
sesses 1 million square kilometers of territory; nearly 2 million peo-
ple; and a GDP of only $600 million. 3 This weak GDP translates
into a $450 per capita income. 144 Over $219 million of Mauritania's
exports were to the EEC and involved either ores or fish, while Mau-
ritania imoprted from the EEC more than $250 million, consisting
mostly of machinery, vehicles, and foodstuffs.145 Mauritanian exports
to the United States amounted to $24 million - nearly all of these
exports were comprised of iron ore; imports from the United States
amounted to $14 million - most of which consist of foodstuffs and
industrial, manufactured goods. 146
Next to Algeria, Morocco is the second largest economic power
in the Maghreb. Morocco has a GDP of over $937;147 a work force
of 6 million; 48 and an unemployment rate of 16.5 % .'4 The national
territory of Morocco, excluding the Western Sahara, is less than
one-half million square kilometers.' 0 Morocco exported $2.7 billion
in textiles, minerals, and foodstuffs to the EEC, and imported $3.1
billion heavily in machinery and vehicles.' 5 ' To the United States,
Morocco exported only $109 million to the United States which con-
sisted of manufactured goods including textiles, electronic parts,
phosphates, and fish.' 52 Imports from the United States amounted to
less than $500 million, consisting mainly of foodstuffs, aircraft
140. BACKGROUND NOTES: LIBYA, supra note 40, at 4-5. This decline of crude oil reve-
nues is due to OPEC production restraints and falling oil prices. The result on per capita
income was a drastic decline from $11,000 in 1980 to $5,500 in 1986. Id. at 5.
141. Harris, supra note 131, at 86.
142. BACKGROUND NOTES: LIBYA, supra note 40, at 5.
143. BACKGROUND NOTES: MAURITANIA, supra note 43, at 1. 1986 figures.
144. Id.
145. EUROSTATE, supra note 133, at 87, 99. Mauritania's most important natural re-
source is high-grade iron ore, and the exports of this ore accounted, until recently, for almost
80% of the export earnings. BACKGROUND NOTES: MAURITANIA, supra note 43, at 5; U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES: MAURITANIA 6-7 (1989) [hereinafter FET: MAURITANIA]. The fishing indus-
try accounted for $272 million of the export earnings in 1988. Id. at 5.
146. This is information supplied separately by the U.S. Department of Commerce on
October 26, 1990, regarding products traded. 1990 statistics. The U.S. share of Mauritanian
exports and imports in 1988 was 3.3% and 18.8 respectively. FET: MAURITANIA, supra note
145, at 2.
147. FET: MOROCCO, supra note 121, at 2. 1988 figures.
148. BACKGROUND NOTES: MOROCCO, supra note 90, at 1. 1985 figure.
149. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 135. 1989 figure.
150. BACKGROUND NOTES: MOROCCO, supra note 90, at 1. These figures do not include
the Western Sahara.
151. EUROSTAT, supra note 133, at 81. 91.
152. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 135, at 17, 249. 1990 statistics.
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equipment, and coal.15
Morocco is rich in human and natural resources. Although Mo-
rocco has few energy sources, it has a strong agricultural industry,
consisting mainly of cereals and fruit,' as well as a textile industry
that has experienced spectacular growth. 155 Furthermore, Morocco is
the largest exporter of phosphates in the world, ' 5  and it has the po-
tential to be a major supplier of fish.' 57 In addition, tourism is a
major Moroccan industry, with over 2 million visitors in 1988.158
In Tunisia, 8 million people 59 reside within 164,149 square ki-
lometers of territory. 160 The per capita income of these people is
$1,324, and the Tunisian GDP is approximately $10.6 billion. The
yearly inflation rate is only 9%,161 but the unemployment rate is
17%.162 Tunisian exports to the EEC were over $1.8 billion in tex-
tiles, hydrocarbons, pharmaceutical products, electrical machinery,
equipment, and fish, while imports from the EEC amounted to $2.4
billion in machinery, electric equipment, cotton, hydrocarbons, and
plastics.' Exports to the United States were only $32 million and
consisted mainly of optical goods and textile products.'64 Tunisia im-
ported from the United States foodstuffs and manufactured parts for
vehicles and planes valued at $118 million.'6 5 Nevertheless, tourism
is Tunisia's largest export at $1.2 billion, while textile exportation is
second at over $700 million.1 6  Since Tunisia is soon expected to im-
port petroleum, 67 it will have to expand its labor-intensive export
industries, such as textiles.' 6 8
153. Id. at 13, 248. 1990 statistics.
154. BACKGROUND NOTES: MOROCCO, supra note 90, at 506.
155. FET: MOROCCO, supra note 121, at 4. The average growth of textile exports has
been over 49% for the past seven years.
156. Id. However, Morocco is the third largest phosphate producer, after the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. Morocco possesses over three-quarters of the world's known reserves of
phosphates. BACKGROUND NOTES: MOROCCO, supra note 90, at 6.
157. Organized fishing, especially off the coast of the Western Sahara, could become as
lucrative as Morocco's phosphate industry. BACKGROUND NOTES: MOROCCO, supra note 90, at
7.
158. FET: MOROCCO, supra note 121, at 12.
159. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES: TUNISIA 2 (1989) [hereinafter FET: TUNISIA]. 1989 estimate.
160. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: TUNISIA
I (1987) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES: TUNISIA].
161. FET: TUNISIA, supra note 159, at 2.
162. Id. at 2. 1987 figure.
163. EUROSTAT, supra note 133, at 82, 83, 93.
164. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 135, at 17, 253.
165. Id. at 13, 252. 1990 statistics.
166. FET: TUNISIA, supra note 159, at 4. 1988 figures. Surprisingly, Libyans are the
most significant contributors to the tourism industry, with one million Libyans spending $600
million in. 1988.
167. Harris, supra note 131, at 82.
168. BACKGROUND NOTES: TUNISIA, supra note 160, at 5. Tunisia has been heavily in-
vesting in the production of facilities for building industry, and its mechanical, electrical and
chemical industries have been growing remarkably. FET: TUNISIA, supra note 159, at 4-5.
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Thus, the Moroccan and Tunisian economies have become very
oriented toward industrialization due to their lack of hydrocarbon
resources. Soon to be faced with a similar exhaustion of crude oil
reserves, Algeria must industrialize to provide employment for its
large work-force. Libya, faced with quickly diminishing natural re-
sources, also must industrialize to employ its smaller population.
Though Mauritania is extremely poor, it too must follow suit to meet
more adequately the needs of its population. Until this industrializa-
tion occurs, present Algerian and Libyan markets will easily be able
to absorb the products from Morocco and Tunisia.16 9
The economies of the Maghrebine countries diverge due to their
diverse political policies. Morocco's economy is based on liber-
alism,1 70 while the economies of Algeria1 71 and Libya are entirely
state controlled. Tunisia, always teetering in the middle, possesses an
economy with elements of both liberalization and state control. Mau-
ritania bases its economy on socialism.1 7 These vastly different econ-
omies pose a serious obstacle toward economic integration, since a
customs union requires harmonization of the Member States' general
patterns of economic controls. 7 1
Unity should first develop by integration on the economic level,
which in the present case will require significant cooperation among
the Member States. However, the large disparity of economic poli-
cies clearly blocks unity. Nevertheless, opportunities for increased in-
tra-Maghrebine trade and industrialization are apparent. These ben-
efits will hopefully provide the impetus to create an effective customs
union.
D. The Treaty Creating The Arab Maghreb Union
The notion of a united Maghreb and solidarity between the
169. El Malki, supra note 46, at 54.
170. Morocco's desire for independence has always accompanied an equal desire to be
open to the outside world, precipitating economic liberalism. Rousset, supra note 26, at 52, 53.
171. Algeria has been considering liberalizing its conditions for foreign investment in
order to attract badly needed foreign capital. Nevertheless, Algeria is fearful that such invest-
ments will result in Algeria losing absolute control over its national economic policy. An exam-
ple of Algeria's determination not to lose this control is its refusal in 1990 to ask for Interna-
tional Monetary Fund aid in paying its external debts. This attitude may change, since in July
1991, the Prime Minister proposed selling $6 billion to $7 billion vorth of shares in the oil and
gas reserves, long considered untouchable national patrimony to foreigners. Benachenhou, La
rforme du secteur public b lordre du jour, L'TAT DU MAGREB 429, 431 (1991); Yachir,
L'conomie algrienne: Les transformations et leurs limites, 448, 451 (1991); Ibrahim, In
Algeria, Hope for Democracy but Not Economy, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1991, at A1, col. I;
A6, col. I.
172. Brunot, supra note 49, at 52, 60. For an in-depth study of the impact of political
philosophies on economic policy in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, see Entelis, The Political
Economy of North African Relations: Cooperation or Conflict? in CONTEMPORARY NORTH
AFRICA: ISSUES OF DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 112-37 (H. Barakat ed. 1985).
173. J. VINER, supra note 119, at 136.
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Arab people was first announced by Mohammed V in 1947.'7 In
1956, Habib Bourguiba adopted this idea. 175 Nevertheless, these
ideas were merely statements that would not mature until a later
time.
In 1964 the Consultative Permanent Committee of the Maghreb
(CPCM) was the first Maghrebine institution.176 The CPCM was
located in Tunis and was comprised of the Ministers of Economy
from Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.177 It's goal was to de-
velop a system of regional commercial preferences and to coordinate
the industrialization and exportation policies of the member
states. a 78 However, the CPCM was not very successful in its objec-
tives,1 79 and -therefore, dissolved in 1975 due to the conflicting polit-
ics of the Member States. 8 '
The Maghrebine States did not begin to come together again
until 1983.181 Nonetheless, it was not until after the two major eco-
nomic powers of the region, Algeria and Morocco, decided to cooper-
ate in 1987, did an agreement on possible unity seem plausible. 182
Professor Sadok Belaid, 85 in anticipating a potential political-eco-
nomic union agreement and in considering the political and eco-
nomic particularities of the Maghrebine Countries, offered several
guidelines for the formation of an Arab Maghreb Union.
Belaid asserted that in order to effectuate an Arab Maghreb
Union, the Union must be both profitable and dynamic. In other
words, the political-economic union must realize long-term goals in
dissolving the present obstacles formed by the nation-state" and
174. Brunot, supra note 49, at 52. Mohammed V was the King of Morocco during this
period.
175. Id. Habib Bourguiba was President-for-life of Tunisia.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 53. Mauritania became a member in 1975.
178. Id. The CPCM wanted to develop horizontal exchanges by harmonizing customs
and providing a list of products to be freely traded within the Member States, to harmonize
politics in the areas of industry, raw materials, energy, transportation and telecommunications,
and to unify the members' positions regarding the European Economic Community (EEC). El
Malki, supra note 46, at 52.
179. lnter-maghrebine commercial exchanges remained low, political coordination with
respect to industry was little, and harmonized, national plans for development were continu-
ously delayed. Nevertheless, there were some positive results in the areas of telecommunica-
tions and rail and air transportation. El Malki, 'supra note 46, at 52.
180. Relations between Libya and Tunisia hit an all time low in 1974 following the
failure of their attempted union. Moreover, Morocco and Algeria were bitterly at odds in 1975
over the Western Sahara. Id. at 53.
181. In 1983 Algeria, Mauritania, and Tunisia signed a treaty of friendship. Daoud,
supra note 114, at 120, 122.
182. Id. at 131-32. The leaders of Algeria and Morcco met and resolved to set aside, for
the time being, their differences over the Western Sahara in order to cooperate with each other
so that a Maghrebine union may be achieved. The two countries resumed diplomatic relations
in 1988.
183. Professor of Law and former Dean, The University of Tunis II, School of Law.
184. This includes dissolving trade barriers such as customs duties and harmonizing ad-
ministrative requirements such as technical specifiations. Concerning the political aspects of
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must provide more benefits to its members than they already enjoy
today."8 5 This Union must also be efficient, in areas in which newly
formed institutions possess actual yet balanced power, to make the
Union work. 8" Thus, the Member States must transfer some of their
sovereign powers to the Union. According to Belaid, this sort of
Union will be achieved pursuant to a treaty with general terms-a
treaty which creates institutions that conduct and further define the
affairs and programs of the Union within the limits of their express
powers.
The Maghrebine States each came to negotiate and formulate
the Arab Magreb Union Treaty 87 with different ideas on what gov-
ernment structures should be formed. 88 Nevertheless, the plans by
Algeria and Morocco for the Union were the ones adopted.1 89 These
plans created rather flexible governing bodies without defined stages
for implementation of requisite programs 9 ' or institutions with ap-
parent, real authority as Belaid foresaw as.necessary.
An important section of the Treaty is the mutual defense provi-
sion, stating that an aggression against one Member State is consid-
ered to be an aggression against all members."'s Moreover, the
the Union, sovereignty will have to be transferred to a central power so that the Union may
act uniformly in certain areas such as foreign relations and domestic affairs. With the
Maghrebine States acting as one unified voice through the Union, they will have more weight
in negotiating with third entities such as the EEC or the United States. See generally infra
notes 250-83 regarding the Maghreb's significant economic interest concerning these two trad-
ing partners. Also, the Union will be able to take measures within its authority to promote
internal development such as building railroads and pipelines or encouraging industry. See
infra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
185. Belaid, supra note 5, at 498. The benefits would most notably be comprised of
increased trade and development.
186. Actual power means that authority to act has been transferred to the Union. Bal-
anced power refers to making sure that the actual authority given to the executive and legisla-
tive branches is not abused or that these branches do not overreach their conceded authority.
Id. Therefore, a judiciary must intervene where necessary. An abuse of power transferred to
the Union or an overreaching thereof may result in Member States leaving the Union. There-
fore, the members will have to compromise some of their sovereignty. Id. at 499.
187. The Treaty is non self-executing and enters into force upon its ratification by each
Member State. AMU Treaty, supra note 1, art. 19. As of yet, it has not been determined if all
Member States have ratified the Treaty. The Treaty may be amended only upon ratification
by all Member States. Id., art. 18.
188. Daoud, supra note 114, at 123. Libya wanted an immediate political union which
would include the Sudan, Chad, and the Niger. Id. In addition, Libya insisted on the creation
of a "Maghrebine Confederation, complete with a Maghrebine flag and national identity card
- to guaranty a total freedom of regional travel by persons and property." Brunot, supra note
49, at 58. Tunisia pushed for a close federation with, a permanent Secretariat and set pro-
gram. Daoud, supra note 114, at 123; Maghrib meeting gets closer, DEFENSE & FOREIGN
AFFAIRS WEEKLY, Feb. 20, 1989 (vol. XV, No. 7, Number 320, 3rd Series) at 4. The General
Secretariat is discussed at infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. The position of Maurita-
nia was not articulated.
189. Daoud, supra note 114, at 123. The acquiescence of Libya, Tunisia, and Maurita-
nia to the plan by Algeria and Morocco indicates the two latter countries' dominance in the
region.
190. Id. at 120, 123.
191. AMU Treaty, supra note I, art. 14.
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Member States vow to "prohibit any activity or training in their ter-
ritory that would violate the security, territorial integrity, or political
regime of a [fellow] member." 192 The Member States also pledge to
refrain from "joining any political or military pact or bloc directed
against the political independence or territorial integrity of the other
member states."193
In recognizing that Member States have existing agreements
with themselves or with other non-Member States or groups, the
Treaty permits each to maintain these agreements and to formulate
future agreements as long as they do not "contradict the rules of the
Treaty. 1 94 The provision of the Treaty is especially pertinent with
respect to economic agreements since Mauritania, Morocco, and Tu-
nisia are GATT members, 195 and Mauritania is a member of the
Economic Community of West African States.""6 Regarding political
arrangements, the Member States clearly will not be allowed to
maintain any sort of accord that would violate the provision of mu-
tual defense and the provision prohibiting an infringement on (or the
permittance of violation to) a fellow member's sovereignty. 197
The Treaty begins with a preamble that legitimizes the Union
through the strong ties of a common history, religion, and language
shared by the Arab Maghreb people. The preamble calls for the
gradual integration of the Maghrebine States, which will grant the
Union more influence in the international community. In addition,
the preamble expresses the desire to integrate other African and
Arab States within the Union. 198 A fundamental g6al of the
Union' 99 is the implementation of a common policy between the
member countries in the areas of foreign policy," °0 defense,2"' econ-
192. Id. art. 15. This provision has apparently had rather interesting ramifications since
Algeria and Libya both aided the Polisario Front in its quest for secession of the Western
Sahara from Morocco. Moreover, Algeria permits the Polisario Front to use its territory as a
refuge and a launching point for guerilla campaigns against Moroccan forces in the Western
Sahara. But upon the signature of the AMU Treaty, Algeria and Libya purportedly stopped
these activities." Hughes, supra note 114; British Boat Destroyed by Guerrillas, supra note
114.
193. AMU Treaty, supra note 1, art. 15.
194. Id., art. 16.
195. See infra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
196. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, May 28, 1975, 14
I.L.M. 1200 (1975). This Treaty created a customs union which is still presently in operation.
Id. arts. 12-14.
197. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
198. AMU Treaty, supra note 1, Preamble. This desire for further integration within
the Union is incorporated in Article 17 of the Treaty. However, admission of other states
requires unanimous approval by the Member States. Id., art. 17.
199. Id., art. 2. Another fundamental goal of the Union particularly worth mentioning is
the desire to work towards achieving the free movement of persons and transfer of goods,
services, and capital.
200. Id., art. 3. If ever achieved, this could serve to bring Libya within a more moderate
stand on international issues.
201. Id. The objective is to preserve the independence of each member country.
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omy,"° and culture.203
The Treaty creates within the Arab Maghreb Union a govern-
mental structure, and the Presidential Council is at its pinnacle. The
Presidential Council consists of the. member countries' chiefs of state
and is the sole decision making body. Decisions are made by the
unanimous consent of the five chiefs of state.2"" The Presidential
Council is headed by a president; the presidency rotates among the
members of the Presidential Council every six months.205 The Presi-
dential Council holds its ordinary sessions every six months and may
reconvene at any time should it deem necessary.20 Nevertheless, the
Treaty does not specify where the Presidential Council will sit. The
Council inferred that the seat will follow the member holding the
six-month presidency." 7
The General Secretariat reports directly to the President of the
Presidential Council. The General Secretariat, composed of a dele-
gate from each Member State, 08 exercises its functions from the
country holding the presidency of the Presidential Council. There-
fore, the General Secretariat has control throughout the entire
Union and is merely located for six months in one Member State.
The President's control over the General Secretariat appears to be
the single attribute of the presidency, 20 9 notwithstanding the tempo-
rary prestige associated with the presidency. The state of the presi-
dency covers the expenses of the General Secretariat. However, the
202. Id. This requires taking all necessary measures to develop industry, agriculture,
commerce, and society in the Member States, especially by common projects and programs.
203. 'Culture includes the development of education through cooperation, the preserva-
tion of spiritual and moral values through tolerant Islamic teaching (evidencing a bias for
moderate views) and the preservation of an Arab national and patriotic identity.
204. Id., arts. 4, 6. The succession of the presidency is in this order: Morocco, Tunisia,
Algeria, Libya, and Mauritania. Uneasy calm restored in Dakar, Mouakchott, The Xinhua
General Overseas News Service (Apr. 26, 1989) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file); South Af-
rica: Mandela and de Klerk to Visit U.S. in June, Inter Press Service (May 15, 1990) (LEXIS,
Nexis library, Omni file); British Boat Destroyed by Guerrillas, supra note 114; Algerian
Prime Minister in Morocco for Cooperation Talks, The Reuters North European Service
(Jan. 7, 1991) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file).
205. AMU Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4. Obviously, the office of President of the Presi-
dential Council is merely a figure head appointment without power since all decision taken by
the Presidential Council requires unanimity. The Treaty does not specify the order of rotation,
which is therefore left to the Presidential Council to decide upon.
206. Id., art. 5. In addition to these meetings by the member chiefs of state, the prime
ministers of the Member States or their representatives may convene whenever deemed neces-
sary. Id. art. 7. The purpose of potential meetings by the prime ministers is not specified in the
Treaty, nor is it stated whether the prime ministers themselves, or the Presidential Council, is
the determinator of when such a meeting is necessary.
207. This inference is drawn from Article I I which states that the General Secretariat,
discussed at infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text, will be located in the country holding
the presidency.
208. Since the method of appointment is not specified, it can only be assumed that ap-
pointment falls within the discretion of each Member State.
209. Id. The President's control is inferred from Article 11, stating: "The General Sec-
retariat shall exercise its function in the country presiding over the session of the Presidential
Council under the office of the President of that country." Id.
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powers and duties of the General Secretariat are not specified, or
even vaguely alluded to, in the Treaty.21
The body created to advise the Presidential Council is the Con-
sultative Council. 21 1 The Consultative Council's purpose is to render
opinions on issues submitted by the Presidential Council. In addition,
the Consultative Council may render recommendations to the Presi-
dential Council that aid in the consolidation 212 of the Union's tasks
and in the realization of the Union's goals. The Consultative Coun-
cil, composed of twenty representatives from each Member State,21 3
holds annual sessions 2 ' and reconvenes at other times upon the re-
quest of the Presidential Council. Again, no mention is made in the
Treaty as to where the Consultative Council will sit or by what
means it will be funded.2 1 5
The Treaty further creates a Council of. Foreign Ministers,
which examines the work submitted to it by the Follow-up Commis-
sion and the Specialized Ministerial Commissions. 21  The Council of
Foreign Ministers prepares an agenda for and attends the meetings
of the Presidential Council.217 Thus, the Council of Foreign Minis-
ters appears to exert much influence in the decisions taken by the
210. Id., art. II.
211. The Consultative Council prepares its internal regulations subject to ratification by
the Presidential Council. Id., art. 12.
212. The French versions of the Treaty interpret the translation of "consolidation" from
the Arabic as to mean the reinforcement of the work or action taken by the Union. Jangor,
supra note 1, at 129; 94 RGDIP at 555.
213. Though-the AMU Treaty called for ten representatives from each Member State,
the Presidential Council increased, pursuant to Article 18, the number to twenty representa-
tives from each state. Arab Maghreb Union Ends Summit Meeting, The Xinhua General
Overseas News Service (Jan. 23, 1990) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file). Article 18 is dis-
cussed at supra note 187.
The representatives are chosen by the legislative bodies of each state according to the
state's individual, local regulations. Though not specifically stated, it is inferred that each state
will choose its respective twenty representatives to the Consultative Council, and not all five
member states agreeing on twenty representatives from each state totaling one hundred repre-
sentatives. AMU Treaty, supra note 1, art. 12.
214. The Consultative Council held its first session on June 10, 1989 in Algiers, where it
urged cooperation in the fields of education, culture, information, and economic joint ventures.
North African States form new Parliament, The Christian Science Monitor, June 13, 1986, at
6.
215. AMU Treaty, supra note 1, art. 12.
216. Id., art. 8. Concerning the Follow-up Commission, there is no provision within the
Treaty which specifically calls for its formation. However, Article 9 alludes to this formation,
stating:
Each member state will appoint a member of its Ministerial Council or
General Popular Committee that would specialize in the affairs of the Union.
They will form a committee charged to follow-up [underline by author] on the
Union's affairs, and will submit the results of its work to the Council of Foreign
Ministers.
Id.
There is a provision creating the Specialized Ministerial Commissions, and these Commis-
sions are set up by the Presidential Council. The Commissions' duties, purposes, size, et cetera
are not specified within the Treaty; Article 10 merely states that the Presidential Council will
define their duties.
217. Id., art. 8.
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Presidential Council. The Council of Foreign Ministers examines,
and probably proposes and edits, the work of the above-mentioned
Commissions, presenting such work to the Presidential Council.218
However, the treaty does not specify the number and percentage of
membership, the method of appointment, the funding and the seat of
the Council of Foreign Ministers.
One important organ created by the Treaty is the Judicial Au-
thority. The purpose of the Judicial Authority is to examine conflicts
that may arise relating to the interpretation and implementation of
the Treaty. Possible conflicts include future agreements made within
the framework of the Treaty. The Judicial Authority acquires juris-
diction to settle issues when it is petitioned by the Presidential Coun-
cil or by a Member State involved in the dispute or pursuant to the
Judicial Authority's Principal Regulations. The decisions rendered
by the Judicial Authority are binding and final.219
In addition to the judicial powers granted to the Judicial Au-
thority, it also provides consultative opinions on legal matters
presented to it by the Presidential Council. The Presidential Council
determines the seat of the Judicial Authority and fixes its budget.
The Judicial Authority must prepare its internal regulations. These
regulations will become part of the Treaty, and are subject to the
Presidential Council's approval.22 '
Each Member State appoints two justices to the Judicial Au-
thority for staggered six-year terms.22 The Judicial Authority elects
a chairman from its ten members every year, although the chairman
does not apparently possess any power beyond that of his fellow
justices. 2
Nevertheless, the Treaty has not addressed all the concerns that
218. Id.
219. Id. art. 13.
220. Id.
221. Id. The notion that the treaty calls for staggered terms is derived from Article 13
of the Treaty, stating:
The Union will have a Judicial Authority composed of two judges appointed
by each member state for a period of six years to be renewed by half every three
years.
id.
This renewal provision in the English version of the Treaty is very ambiguous. The French
version of this part of Article 13, from Jangor, supra note I, at 129, elucidates more with:
L'Union disposera d'un organe juridique compose de dux judges puor
chaque etat, disignbs par lEtat concern pour une duroe de six ans et renouvel-
able par moiti tous les trois ans.
Id.
That is to say, of the two judicial appointments which a Member State must take, one of the
justice's terms will expire three years after the other justice's term expires. Thus, justice A and
justice B will be initially appointed by Member State Z for six years. In reality thought, either
A's or B's term must last, in effect, for nine years. Thereafter, the staggered six-year terms of
half of the Judicial Authority will be achieved.
222. However, this could change given the fact that the internal regulations of the Judi-
cial Authority have neither been prepared nor approved at this time.
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are necessary for its proper functioning. For instance, the Treaty
does not specify whether a majority or unanimity is required for the
Judicial Authority to arrive at a "decision." In addition, since the
Presidential Council fixes the budget of the Judicial Authority and
since the Presidential Council requires unanimity to make a decision,
a Member State could block the entire budget of the Judicial Au-
thority or reduce the budget to a nullity. The Judicial Authority,
therefore, would cease without independent contributions by the
other member states.
In summary, the Treaty is too simply structured, leaving out
many important details to be negotiated at a later date. The entire
bureaucracy of the Union, except the Judiciary Authority, appears
to follow the president of the Presidential Council on its rotation
from member state to member state. The Treaty fails to define the
technical duties and responsibilities of many of the organs created,
the percentage representation, the duration of appointment terms,
and the method of appointment. Furthermore, funding for the struc-
ture of the Union is not addressed within the Treaty. Most impor-
tantly, no fixed dates for implementation of any possible programs
are provided. Given the fact that the Presidential Council requires
unanimity to render a decision, each member state has conserved an
absolute sovereignty, 2 3 which has the effect of severely limiting pos-
sible action by any of the organs created. This situation could des-
tine the Arab Maghreb Union to suffer a similar fate as that of its
predecessor, the CPCM.224
E. Cooperation Thus Far Within the AMU
Since Algeria has been damaged from price fluctuations in
crude oil, it has decided to expand its natural gas production.22 5
With the new warming of relations between Algeria and Morocco in
1988, the two began negotiating a deal to jointly build a multi-mil-
lion-dollar, 2,000 kilometer, gas pipeline that would traverse Algeria
and go under the Strait of Gibraltar via Morocco.226 This pipeline
will enable Algeria to capture important markets in Spain and to
223. For this reason it appears that there is no provision for withdrawal from the Union,
since all a member state must do is simply abstain from voting in, or vote against all proposals
before, the Presidential Council to render inoperative the Union.
224. The possible exceptions to this statement are the provisions for mutual defense and
the prohibition against any infringements on, or the permittance of violations against, a fellow
member state's sovereignty, as stated in Articles 14 and 15. Therefore, what is left, in essence,
is a treaty of friendship and good neighborly relations. This statement is especially true in that
as of present, no concrete steps have been taken to implement any programs necessary toward
realizing a political, economic unity.
225. Noori, Maghreb Pipeline could ease Europe's reliance on Soviet gas, The Reuters
Library Report, (Oct. 7, 1988) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file).
226. Clayton, Maghreb Pipeline could ease Europe's reliance on Soviet gas, The
Reuters Library Report (Oct. 7, 1988) (LExIs, Nexis library, Omni file).
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link up with the European network. It is anticipated that Algeria
will become the EEC's main supplier of natural gas.22 7 Morocco, for
its part, will receive cheap Algerian natural gas and will earn transit
fees. The pipeline will be completed in 1995, and a joint Moroccan-
Algerian company, headquartered in Morocco with a capital of
$500,000 will be created. 228
Similar pipeline proposals, involving Algeria, Libya, and Tuni-
sia, are in the planning stage to better access Greece and Italy. 229
Presently, Tunisia and Algeria are operating a transmediterranean
pipeline from Algeria, across Tunisia, to Sicily.23 0 Furthermore, the
Maghrebine Countries have agreed to integrate the operations of
their national carriers for air transportation. This integration in-
volves recognizing each other's tickets, sharing revenues on some
lines, servicing each other's planes and joint training.231
On May 6, 1990, The Maghreb Council of Transport Ministers
adopted resolutions for the creation of a common carrier, Air
Maghreb. A commission was formed to effectuate the project on fi-
nancial and technical levels.2 32 In addition, resolutions were passed
to make more time efficient the Casablanca-Tunis passenger trans-
port services. The Council also agreed that Libya and Mauritania
should be connected on the Maghreb railway network.2 33
The Arab Maghreb Union has instituted no substantial or con-
crete achievements to date. The inherent weaknesses of the Treaty
creating the Union of the Arab Maghreb, which attempts to group
States of such diverging policies, has resulted in its members arrang-
ing bilateral agreements between themselves, as demonstrated by the
Moroccan-Algerian pipeline negotiation.
III. GATT, EEC, and U.S. Implications
A. GATT Obligations of the Arab Maghreb Union
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), formed
on October 30, 1947,23' embodies the economic principle of compar-
227. See generally Pipelines, The Financial Times Limited, June 8, 1990.
228. See generally Pipelinei, The Financial Times Limited, April 27, 1990.
229. Morocco, Algeria Agree on Gas Pipeline Project, The Reuters Library Report
(Sept. 16, 1988) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file).
230. Noori, supra note 210.
231. North African Airlines take first step toward joint company, The Reuters Library
Report (May 4, 1990) (LExis, Nexis library, Omni file).
232. Maghrib Arab Press, Maghreb air carrier to be established, The British Broadcast-
ing Corporation (May 15, 1990).
233. Id.
234. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. The official text
of the agreement, last amended in 1965, is found in THE TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, U.N. Sales No. GATT/1986-4 (1986), and in 4 CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE. BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SE-
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ative advantage in world trade. 35 The goal of GATT is the enhance-
ment of world trade by negotiating lower tariff barriers . 6 These ne-
gotiations contribute to the development of the world's economy by
increasing trade, thus, creating a system of harmonious trade and
integrating the economies of the participating states through greater
trade liberalization.23 To achieve these objectives, GATT embodies
the principle of Most-Favored-Nation (MFN). Under this principle,
products from any contracting party2"8 are to be accorded "no less
favorable" treatment than like products from any other contracting
party.239
One step toward greater trade liberalization, which is an allowa-
ble divergence from MFN, is the formation of a customs union. 40
GATT allows customs unions to be created between contracting par-
ties provided that the purpose of such customs union "should be to
facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise
barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territo-
ries. 24 1 In other words, the customs union must create trade as op-
posed to divert trade.242
The procedures for the formation of a customs u'nion is within
GATT require that the customs unions regulation of commerce does
not become overly restrictive to the other contracting parties24 ' and
that the contracting parties forming the customs union design a plan
LECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter GATT, BISD].
235. J. JACKSON. WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 330 (1969).
236. R. IMHOOF. LE GATT ET LES ZONES DE LIBRE-ECHANGE 8 (1979).
237. Id. at 8-9.
238. Contracting parties, whether in the singular or plural, refers to the individual sig-
natories to the GATT. T. FLORY, LE GATT: DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET COMMERCE MONDIAL
254 (1968).
239. This principle is also referred to as nondiscrimination. Demonstrating the signifi-
cance of Most Favored Nations (MFN) in the GATT, it has been incorporated in GATT,
supra note 237, art. I. "No less favorable" treatment demonstrates the GATT's conviction that
discrimination is trade-diverting and therefore must be discouraged. Id.
240. W. Davey, supra note 123, at 271, 455; J. JACKSON, supra note 235, at 271. A
customs union is defined as:
[T]he substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs
territories, so that
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce . . .are
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constit-
uent territories of the union ... and,
(ii) . . substantially the same duties and other regulations of com-
merce are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade of
territories not included in the union[.]
GATT, supra note 237, art. XXIV(8)(a).
241. This paragraph merely states a principle and has no independent binding force
upon the contracting parties. However, it does serve as a basis to interpret the other provisions
of art. XXIV and provides the GATT with a base to weigh the possible effects of a treaty
creating a customs union. R. IMHOFF, supra note 221, at 62-65. See also J. JACKSON, supra
note 235, at 599-607.
242. T. FLORY, supra note 238, at 93.
243. GATT, supra note 234, art. XXIV(5)(a).
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and schedule within a reasonable amount of time.2" Once a con-
tracting party enters into an agreement for a customs union or an
interim agreement, the contracting party who desire the customs
union must notify GATT 245 GATT may deny its formation if it ap-
pears that such a customs union will not be formed within the period
contemplated or that period is unreasonable.246
Nevertheless, in practice, some contracting parties have notified
GATT of a customs union formation after the agreement had al-
ready entered into force.247 In addition, GATT's control of the ac-
ceptance of rejection of a customs union is limited to the plan, tariff
schedule, and time of implementation of the customs union.248 How-
ever, the trade-creating principle enounced in Article XXIV, para-
graph 4, could serve as an interpretive device for weighing the bene-
fits and detriments of a customs union.249
Relating the application of Article XXIV to developing coun-
tries, it is applied in a relaxed manner to aid these countries in
achieving economic unification.250 In the beginning, GATT justified
244. Id., art. XXIV(5)(c). It is within GATT's discretion to determine what is a reason-
able amount of time. T. FLORY, supra note 238, at 93.
245. GATT, supra note 234, art. XXIV(7)(a). Article XXIV(7)(a) states that any
"contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union ... shall promptly notify the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES .... " (emphasis added). This general language was preferred by
the drafters over language which would have specifically required notification before entering
into an agreement, which would have given the GATT the opportunity to approve or disap-
prove the customs union before a contracting party entered into it. Under the present language
of the subparagraph, the duty to notify apparently does not arise until at least after an agree-
ment has been signed. R. IMHOOF, supra note 236, note 4 at 97, 97-98.
246. GATT, supra note 234, art. XXIV(7)(b).
247. One example of such a situation is the Caribbean Free-Trade Association, where
the member states did not notify the GATT of the formation of a free-trade area until three
years after the free-trade area went into force. R. IMHOOF, supra note 236, note 5 at 97.
248. Nevertheless, the GATT still allowed the formation of a free-trade area between
Australia and New Zealand even though these countries had not yet sufficiently completed a
plan or program. The rationale was that the treaty implementing the free-trade area was only
provisional. However, the GATT requested that the completed plan and program be submitted
as soon as possible. T. FLORY, supra note 238, at 148.
249. R. IMHOFF, supra note 236, at 100. A possible argument against the allowance of a
customs union in the present case is that the political and economic reasons for the formation
of the Arab Maghreb Union are not in accordance with the stated art. XXIV(4) policy. The
Arab Maghreb Union members feel that together they will be more likely to influence the
European Community. Murphy, supra note 3, at 4. This hardly appears to be in conformity
with the GATT desire to enhance trade. In addition, the Arab Maghreb Union members only
conduct about 3% of their total trade intra-regionally; they conduct 60% of their trade with
the EEC. Id. Moreover, much of the members' trade involves the same products. Id. Thus,
enhanced trade by specialization may not occur, though the creation of a political block to
influence the EEC is likely. Nevertheless, GATT provides no specific, independent provision to
combat or prevent the formation of a customs union for such purposes. However, paragraph
four may be invoked as an interpretive device which could serve to reject this sort of customs
union by GATT. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
250. R. IMHOOF, supra note 236, at 116. See also T. FLORY, supra note 238, at 129.
One such example was the Latin American Free-trade Association, which instituted a free-
trade area in 1960 between Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, Mexico, and Paraguay.
The Association lacked a precise program for trade liberalization, and the immediate suppres-
sion of all trade restrictions between the Member States could not be foreseen. The GATT
Working Group also surmised that the free-trade area would be trade diverting, as opposed to
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this lax application process based solely upon political and economic
grounds, in an attempt to give affect to the non-ratified Havana
Charter251 and to take into account the poor economic situations of
developing countries. 5 ' Since 1965, the amendment of GATT by
Part IV provided a legal basis for this lax application.2 53 Signifi-
cantly, Part IV allows GATT to permit contracting parties "to use
special measures to promote their trade and development." 2 5 Thus,
when an agreement for a customs' union based on Part IV, has been
reached between developing countries, GATT will approve a priori
the customs union, whether or not it is consistent with Article
XXIV, MFN, or any other GATT objectives.255
Although the Maghrebine Countries will be afforded much lati-
tude in the formation of a customs union, the problem remains that
not all of these countries are members of GATT. Mauritania was
the first Maghrebine Country to accede to GATT on September 30,
1963.256 Morocco followed much later and acceded on May 18,
trade creating, thereby in breach of Article XXIV(4). Nevertheless, due to the fact the Associ-
ation grouped developing countries, the GATT did not exercise rigorous control over it. In fact,
the requirements for a free-trade area were liberally and tolerantly interpreted, thus affording
the Association much more latitude than that which would have been allowed to developed
States. T. FLORY, supra note 238, at 135-37.
Another example of laxed application of the GATT to developing countries forming a
customs union is the case of the Equatorial Customs Union. Here, the GATT allowed the
member states of the customs union to triple the common exterieur tariff, recognizing that in
order for this customs union to be effective in promoting development and production diversifi-
cation, it was necessary to provide adequate tariff protection during at least the initial stages.
Id. at 129-30.
251. Negotiations from 1947-1948 in Havana led to the International Trade Organiza-
tion (ITO) Charter, commonly referred to as the Havana Charter. The Havana Charter con-
tained provisions allowing for preferential arrangements between developing countries, subject
to a two-thirds vote of approval by all signatories. Although these provisions were intended to
be integrated into the GATT, they were delayed, assuming the ITO and its Charter would
replace the GATT. The ITO never reached fruition, and these provisions fell into obscurity. J.
JACKSON, supra note 235, at 577-78.
252. R. IMHOOF, supra note 236, at 116-17. GATT will permit regional integration in
order to expedite the effects of integration on the developing countries, to increase these coun-
tries' trade between themselves, and also to better help them participate in world trade. Help-
ing the developing countries to better participate in world trade will create new trade flows
from which the developed countries will also benefit. id. at 119.
253. Part IV merely expresses moral commitments, with no legal binding effect, by the
developed countries to the developing countries. Nevertheless, the developed countries have felt
obligated to stand by these commitments. R. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM 56-59 (1987).
Part IV was adopted pursuant to the Declaration on the defacto Implementation of the
Provisions of the Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Intro-
duce a Part IV on Trade and Development, Feb. 8, 1965, reprinted in GATT, 13 BISD 10-11
(1966).
254. GATT, supra note 234, art. XXXVI(l)(f). In addition, developed contracting par-
ties may enter into preferential trade arrangements with developing contracting parties, which
remove or reduce the developed contracting parties' tariffs against the developing contracting
parties, so long as there is no reciprocity. That is to say, the developing contracting parties do
not have to remove or lower their tariffs against the developed contracting parties. Id., art.
XXXVI(8) at 1980.
255. R. IMHOOF, supra note 236, at 124.
256. GATT, 12 BISD 33-34 (1965). Mauritania's accession was pursuant to art.
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1987.57 Tunisia continuously has renewed its provisional accession
to GATT since November 12, 1959.258 On the other hand, Algeria
applies GATT on a de facto basis and benefits from MFN and
GATT members' tarriff schedules, so long as Algeria grants.MFN
treatment to GATT members. 259  Libya is the only Maghrebine
country which does not have any affiliation with GATT.
The Latin American Free-Trade Association (LAFTA) is an
example of a situation in which some but not all of the members of a
would-be customs union are GATT members. Formed in 1960,
LAFTA was comprised of seven countries; two of these seven coun-
tries were not GATT members and one had only provisionally ac-
ceded to GATT. 26 ° The non-GATT members of LAFTA also were
required to conform to Article XXIV requirements. 21
Thus, Article XXIV procedures and requirements must be fol-
lowed by Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia since they have ac-
XXVI(5)(c) where a newly independent state would inherit the tariff schedule applied to it by
the former colonial ruler, which is a contracting party. Id. at 33; J. JACKSON, supra note 235,
at 98. If no such tariff schedule for the former colony existed, the newly independent state
would be able to join GATT without any tariff concessions at all. Id. at 98.
The newf country must have been sponsored for membership by the former colonial power,
per Article XXVI(5)(c), and the new country must thereafter apply GATT on a de facto
basis. Reciprocally GATT will apply to the new country on a defacto basis, so that the new
country may have time to formulate its international commercial policies and decide whether
it wishes to join GATT. Id. at 97. Mauritania's rights and obligations as a contracting party to
GATT were to date from the day of its independence, November 28, 1960. GATT,.supra note
253, at 33-34.
257. GATT, 34 BISD 3 (1988). Morocco's accession was pursuant to Article XXVI(4).
Id. at 4-5. This provision allows for automatic admission to the GATT upon acceptance by the
applicant country. However, pursuant to article XXVI(2), the applicant country must have
been negotiating on March 5, 1955 for accession. It is doubtful that this was the case for
Morocco, since the Working Party recommended admission per Article XXXIII, requiring a
two-thirds majority vote by the Contracting Parties. GATT,' 33 BISD, 87 96 (1987).
258. Tunisia continuously renews its GATT affiliation for one to two year periods. See
Provisional Accession of Tunisia, para. 6, reprinted in GATT, 8 BISD 15-16 (1960). This
provisional accession was last reportedly renewed until December 31, 1989. GATT, 15 BISD
(1989). It is assumed that this has once again been renewed and effective at present.
Tunisia enjoys, under provisional accession, the GATT tariffs and applies its negotiated
tariffs. Provisional Accession of Tunisia, GATT, 8 BISD 15-16, para. 1 (1960). Nevertheless,
Tunisia's status does not grant it any direct rights with respect to the tariff concessions in
GATT. Id. Complete accession to the GATT by Tunisia is anticipated per Article XXXIII. Id.
259. GATT, 9 BISD 16 (1961). Though the defacto application was last renewed until
1967, GATT, 14 BISD 12 (1967), it still continues to be applied. GATT, 35 BISD IX (1989).
260. LAFTA in 1960 was comprised of Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, Mex-
ico, and Paraguay. Mexico and Paraguay were not GATT members and Argentina had only
provisionally acceded to the GATT. T. FLORY, supra note 238, at 135.
261. Id. at 135-36. However, see note 254 discussing the lax application of these regula-
tions to all LAFTA members. See also the case when the United Kingdom and the Republic
of Ireland formed a free-trade area in 1965. Though the United Kingdom was a GATT mem-
ber, Ireland.was not a GATT member at the time. In order for the GATT to approve the free-
trade area, Ireland vowed that it would respect GATT regulations. Id. at 149.
The end result of a non-GATT member of a customs union applying Article XXIV regu-
lations is that its external tariffs must be lowered to that of the GATT member's tariffs of the
customs union. This is not the case in a free-trade area since each member maintains its own
external tariffs and may apply internal tariffs against products imported to the GATT member
which reach the non-GATT member.
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ceded, whether fully or provisionally, to GATT. 2 ' Algeria and
Libya are the only two countries which do not have Article XXIV
obligations, but they will nevertheless be indirectly obliged to adhere
to GATT regulations to ensure that Mauritania, Morocco, and Tuni-
sia do not breach their GATT duties. If a political union occurs, the
GATT members of the Arab Maghreb Union will lose their GATT
affiliation. The Union, therefore, will have to apply for accession to
GATT to receive MFN tariff benefits.283
No plan, schedule, or time frame for the implementation of a
customs union within the Arab Maghreb Union has been supplied to
GATT.2"4 No immediate duty on behalf of these countries appears
necessary due to the latitude GATT affords to developing countries.
In addition, the customs union has not been implemented and will
not likely to implemented within the very near future.
B. EEC Agreements Concluded with the Maghreb
In 1978 the EEC entered into trade agreements with Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia 26 5 pursuant to Part VI of the Treaty of
Rome.2 6 According to the Maghreb Cooperation Agreements, most
industrial products which originate2 17 in Algeria, Morocco, and Tu-
262. Article XXIV(I) requires that GATT members, who have acceded per Article
XXVI, or to whom the GATT is applied per Article XXXIII, or in accordance with the Proto-
col of Provisional Application, adhere to the procedures and requirements of Article XXIV.
See notes 255-57 explaining how these countries acceded to the GATT.
263. This statement presupposes that a single customs territory will have already been
formed within the Arab Maghreb Union, or that none of the formerly independent states en-
joys fully autonomy in its external commercial relations, since these are the requirements of a
contracting party. See GATT, supra note 237, arts. XXXII, XXXIII, XXVI.
Since the GATT requires admission and defines the procedures for admission, interna-
tional law allows for strict adherence to these procedures when state succession is involved.
These procedures must be strictly adhered to. J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 355-56, 655-56 (8th ed. 1977). The rights and obligations which the members of
the Arab Maghreb Union may have had with the GATT will not be enforceable, since third
parties, here the GATT members, cannot be bound by such a succession, unless they make an
express declaration to be bound or impliedly do so by their conduct. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 653 (3rd ed. 1979).
264. Letter of Liliane Rastello, Principal Directrice of Information to the GATT, of
October 24, 1990.
265. Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Peo-
ple's Democratic Republic of Algeria, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 263) 2 (1978).
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom
of Morocco, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 264) 2 (1978).
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of
Tunisia, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 265) 2 (1978).
Since all three agreements are substantially similar in import, they will be collectively
referred to as the "Maghreb Cooperation Agreements" hereinafter.
266. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), Part VI, 2
B.D.I.E.L. 45 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome], stating, in pertinent part, that "[tlhe Community
may conclude with a third state, a union of states or an international organization establishing
an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special proce-
dures." Id. art. 238.
267. Protocol 2 of the Maghreb Cooperation Agreements broadly defines "originating
products" of a signatory (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, EEC) as products wholly obtained within
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nisia, can be imported into the EEC free of quantitative restrictions
and customs duties.2"8 However, the product must be transported di-
rectly from any of these Maghrebine countries to the EEC. If direct
transport is not effectuated, then an explanation must be provided
and the product must have been kept under surveillance by the cus-
toms authorities in the intermediate country.2"9
For example, although many petroleum products and natural
cork were allowed into the EEC without customs duties, these prod-
ucts were subject to annual quantity ceilings, and customs duties
were applied when the quantity imported exceeded the ceiling.27 0
the signatory. Maghreb Cooperation Agreements, Protocol 2, art, I(I), supra note 249; (No. L
263), at 40; 21 0.1 EUR. COMM. (No. L 264) art. I(l), art 38; and OJ EUR. COMM. (No. L
265) art. I(I), at 38.
Wholly obtained products of a signatory generally refers to minerals or food produced in
the signatory. Id., Protocol 2, art. 2., (No. L 263), at 40-41; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 264),
at 38-39; 21 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 265), at 38-39.
Where one of these Maghrebine Countries obtains products from one or both of the other
two stated Maghrebine Countries, or from the EEC, and these products undergo working or
processing in the acquiring Maghrebine Country, those products will be considered by the
EEC as originating from that Maghrebine Country. Id. Protocol 2 art. 1(2), (No. L 263), at
40; 21 O.J. EUR. COMm. 38. When products wholly obtained in one of the Maghrebine Coun-
tries undergoes working or processing in the EEC, those products are to be considered by the
Maghrebine Countries as wholly obtained with the EEC. Id. Protocol 2, art. 1(3), (No. L
263), at 40; 21 0.1. EUR. COMM. (No. L 264), at 38; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 265), at 38.
In addition, "originating products" also includes products obtained in a signatory, where
products not wholly obtained in the signatory were used to manufacture the product, so long as
the products undergo sufficient working or processing. Id. Protocol 2, art. 1(1), (No. L 263), at
40; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 264), at 38; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 265), at 38. Where
the working or processing takes place in either of the other two Maghrebine Countries, or in
the EEC, and the product undergoes subsequent working or processing in the acquiring
Maghrebine Country, that product will be deemed by the EEC as originating from the
Maghrebine Country which last performed the working or processing. (The one exception to
this last statement is Tunisia, where when the working or processing takes place in Algeria,
Morocco or the EEC, and the product undergoes subsequent working or processing in Mo-
rocco, the working or processing will nevertheless be deemed as having been carried out in
Tunisia.) Id. Protocol 2, art. 1(2), (No. L 263), at 40; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 264), at 38;
21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 265), at 38. When a product has undergone working or processing
in a Maghrebine Country, and that product thereafter undergoes subsequent working or
processing in the EEC, that Maghrebine Country must consider the product to have undergone
working or processing in the EEC. Id. Protocol 2, art. 1(3), (No. L 263), at 40; 21 0.1. EuR.
COMM. (No. L 264), at 38; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 265), at 38.
Thus, further trade concessions to the Maghreb become apparent since products from the
Maghreb, which undergo working or processing in the EEC, and are shipped from the EEC to
the Maghreb, will be subject to Maghrebine tariffs. Whereas, conversely, a product from the
EEC, which undergoes working or processing in the Maghreb, may be exported to the EEC
and accorded the favorable tariff treatment as provided in the Agreements.
Generally, sufficient working and processing is defined to exclude minimal transformations
such as preservation of the goods during transport and storage, cleaning, sorting or classifying
the goods, packaging or breaking up and mixing the goods, affixing marks or labels on the
goods, assembly of the goods, and the slaughter of animals. Id. Protocol 2, art. 3(3), (No. L
263), at 41; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 264), at 39; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 265), at 39.
268. Maghreb Cooperation Agreements, art. 9(1), (No. L 263), at 5; 21 0.1. EuR.
COMM. (No. L 264), at 5; 21 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 265), at 5. Industrial products which do
not receive free access to the EEC market are listed in annex II of the Maghreb Cooperation
Agreements. Id.
269. Id. Protocol 2, arts. l(l), 5, (No. L 263), at 40, 42; 21 0.1 EUR. COMM. (No. L
264), at 38, 40; 21 0.1. EUR. COMM. (No. L 265), at 38, 40.
270. Id. art. 12, (No. L 263), at 6-7; 21 0.1. EUR. COMM. (No. L 264), at 6-7; 21 01
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However, these ceiling amounts were voided by 1980.271 In addition,
the duties on most agricultural products originating 272 and trans-
ported 273 from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia were substantially,
and sometimes wholly, reduced. One important agricultural product
to receive this favorable treatment is fish. Its tariff was reduced by
100%. 27 Nevertheless, textile products from Morocco and Tunisia
are subjected to negotiated import quotas.17 6
The Maghreb Cooperation Agreements (Agreements) accord
many concessions by the EEC to these three Maghrebine Countries.
These countries must grant MFN treatment in return to EEC prod-
ucts. 276 In any event, the EEC is assured MFN status due to the
Maghrebine Countries' affiliations with GATT.277 Thus, since these
Agreements are in essence non-reciprocal concessions on the part of
the EEC to the Maghrebine Countries, and since the EEC may uni-
laterally terminate the Agreements with six months' notice,278 the
reasons for the Maghrebine Countries' paranoia of possibly losing
their preferential market has become readily apparent.2 79
As a signatory to the Lom6 IV Convention, 80 Mauritania is en-
titled to directly export to the EEC, free of customs duties, all prod-
ucts that originate from within Mauritania or any of the other sixty-
nine designated African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) States. 8 '
EUR. COMM. (No. L 265), at 6-7. Nevertheless, the EEC reserved the right to modify conces-
sions regarding the petroleum products upon adoption of a common definition of origin for
petroleum products, of decisions under a common commercial policy, or of a common energy
policy. Id. art. 13(1), (No. L 263), at 7; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 264), at 7; 21 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 265), at 7.
271. Id. art. 12(5), (No. L 263), at 7; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 264), at 7; 21 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 265), at 7; Bruno, EEC Trade Agreements with Middle Eastern Coun-
tries, 4 Middle East Executive Reports 9 (Jan. 1981).
272. See supra note 252 defining "originating products."
273. See supra note 254 and accompanying text defining "directly transported."
274. Id. art. 15, (No. L 263), at 8-14; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 264), at 8-15; 21 OJ.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 265), at 8-15. The concessions covered more than 80% of the Maghrebine
agricultural exports to the EEC, also including citrus fruits, tomatoes, and potatoes. J. McMA-
HON. EUROPEAN TRADE POLICY IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 142 (1988).
275. Promethee, Annuaire 1991 des Accords Textiles de la CEE D5-D9 (1991) [herein-
after Prometheel.
276. Maghreb Cooperation Agreements, supra note 250, L263 art. 25(1), at 19; L264
art. 27(1), at 18; L265 art. 26(1), at 18. These Agreement Articles also state that this MFN
obligation may be breached "in the case of measures adopted with a view to the economic
integration of the Maghreb." Id., art. 25(3). Furthermore, any one of these Maghrebine coun-
tries may derogate from the MFN obligation should it enter into a customs union of free trade
area. Id., art. 25(2). No mention is made of a complimentary derogation from the definition of
an originating product. See Protocol 2, supra note 267.
277. See supra notes 255-58 discussing the GATT affiliations of these Maghrebine
countries.
278. Maghreb Cooperation Agreements, supra note 250, (No. L 263), art. 55, at 24; 21
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 264), art. 57, at 22; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 265), art. 56, at 22.
279. See supra note 235 depicting this fear of the Maghreb of a possible set-back in
their most important market, the EEC.
280. The EEC was authorized to negotiate the nonreciprocal Lome Convention IV pur-
suant to the Treaty of Rome. Treaty of Rome, supra note 266, art. 238.
281. Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783, 84, art. 168, Protocol
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Originating products, as listed in Protocol 1 of the Convention, in-
clude fish and minerals - Mauritania's sole exports. 282 In addition,
these products cannot be subjected by the EEC to quotas or other
quantitative import restrictions. 283 The Convention, which went into
effect on March 1, 1990, will remain in effect for ten years.284 Nev-
ertheless, any signatory, the EEC, or any ACP, may withdraw from
the Convention with six months' notice. In addition, the EEC may
unilaterally cease application of the Convention to any ACP with the
same notice. 8 5 Thus, ACP's fear a potential EEC legal derogation.
Thus, all of the Maghrebine Countries, except Libya, have con-
cluded trade agreements with the EEC which give them valuable
preferences. With the advent of 1992, these agreements will consti-
tute the only preferential arrangements that the Maghrebine Coun-
tries enjoy in the EEC, since agreements between individual EEC
States and the Maghreb will be eliminated. 8 The possibility of los-
ing preferential treatment in the Maghreb's largest market certainly
provides an impetus for unity, to influence more effectively EEC leg-
islation; however, it is-evident that this EEC legislation has created
"trading blocks" within the Arab Maghreb Union, which can only
deter, rather than aid, the Arab Maghreb Union members in achiev-
ing a successful union.
C. United States Legislation Relating to the Maghreb
The Trade Act of 1974 instituted within the United States the
non-reciprocal Generalized System of Preferences (System). This
System provides that the United States President, at the person's
discretion, "may provide duty-free treatment for any eligible article
from any beneficiary developing country .... *"287 Duty-free treat-
1, art. 10, 888 (1990) [hereinafter Lome IV Convention]. These provisions are rather similar
to those of the Maghreb Cooperation Agreements.
282. Specifically stated, wholly obtained products from the ACP or EEC include:
(a) mineral products extracted from their soil or from their seabed;
(f) products of sea fishing and other products taken from the sea by their
vessels[.]
Id. Protocol 1, art. 2, at 887. Protocol I is incorporated into the Convention per Article 368, at
885.
See notes 135-36 and accompanying text describing Mauritanian exports.
283. Lom6 IV Convention, supra note 281, art. 169, at 845.
284. Id., art. 366, at 885.
285. Id., art. 367, at 885.
286. Lancaster, Completing the European Market, in THE IMPACT OF EUROPE IN 1992
ON WEST AFRICA 25, 29 (0. Obasanjo & H. d'Orville eds. 1990).
287. A beneficiary developing country is broadly defined as a country that has been
designated by the President, either by Executive Order or by Presidential Proclamation, to be
a beneficiary developing country. 19 U.S.C. 2461 (1988).
The prerequisite that a beneficiary developing country be a country merely requires that it
be a foreign country, an overseas dependent territory of a foreign country or a possession of a
foreign country. 19 U.S.C. 2462(a)(1) (1988). This definition of a country also includes the
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ment will be accorded to designated, eligible articles" 8 from benefi-
ciary developing countries, even though subsidies were provided in
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 19 U.S.C. 2462(a)(3) (1988). The Congress refused to
define or provide a list of what is a developing country since such designation would be subject
to change and could imply a right to benefit from generalized preferences. However, a list was
provided of eligible countries to be considered for beneficiary developing country status in
1974; a list which included all five of the Maghrebine countries. 4 U.S. CODE & CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7186, 7349 (West 1974). However, in determining whether to designate any
country as a beneficiary developing country, the President must consider if the country itself
wants such status conferred upon it, the level of economic developing of the country, if other
developed countries are extending generalized preferential tariff treatment to the country, to
what extent the country has made assurances to the United States that it will provide equita-
ble and reasonable access to its markets and basic commodity resources and refrain from en-
gaging in unreasonable export practices, if the country protects intellectual property rights, the
extent to which the country has reduced barriers to trade in servcies, and if the country at-
tempts to grant to its workers internationally recognized workers rights. 19 U.S.C. 2462(c)
(1988).
The President designates eligible articles by Executive Order or by Presidential proclama-
tion. 19 U.S.C. 2463(a) (1988). However, import-sensitive articles are exempted from eligible
article designation, as listed in 19 U.S.C. 2463(c) (1988).
The President is required to consider the effect of such duty-free treatment on the further-
ance of the economic development of developing countries through expansion of their exports,
the extent to which other developed countries have granted such treatment to the products of
the developing countries, the impact of duty-free treatment on U.S. producers of like or di-
rectly competitive products, and how competitive the beneficiary developing country will be
with respect to the eligible articles accorded such favorable treatment. 19 U.S.C. 2461 (1988).
An eligible article must be imported directly from the beneficiary developing country to
the United States and the costs for producing the article in the beneficiary developing country
(costs of materials plus direct costs of processing operations) are not less than 35% of the
appraised value of the article within the United States. 19 U.S.C. 2463(b) (1988).
"Imported directly" is defined as: the direct shipment of the eligible article from the bene-
ficiary developing country to the United States without having passed through another coun-
try; if the eligible article has passed through another country, that article has not entered into
the intermediate country's commerce, so long as the bill of lading and invoice show the United
States as the final destination; or if the eligible article is shipped through another country
without the invoice or bill of lading indicating the United States as the final destination, the
article must have remained under the customs control of the intermediate country, it must be
sold other than at retail, and it must not have been altered except by loading and unloading, or
for preservation. However, if the eligible article passes through a free-trade zone, which is
determined by the U.S. Government, to which the beneficiary developing country is a member,
the article may not be altered except by sorting, grading, packing or unpacking, affixing labels
or marks, or by performing operations to preserve the article in its original condition. In addi-
tion, within a free-trade zone, the eligible article may be purchased and resold for export so
long as this is not done in a retail market. 19 C.F.R. 10.175 (1990).
For an eligible article to meet the 19 U.S.C. 2463(b) (1988) requirement of having been
produced within a beneficiary developing country, the constituent materials comprising the
article must be either: "(1) wholly the growth, product, or manufacture of the beneficiary
developing country; or (2) substantially transformed within the beneficiary developing country
into a new and different article of commerce. 19 C.F.R. 10.177(a)(1) & (2) (1990).
The cost or value of the materials produced in any beneficiary developing country is com-
puted by adding the manufacturer's actual cost. for the materials, transportation, waste dispo-
sal and taxes. 19 C.F.R. 10.177(c)(1) (1990). (However, see infra note 289 discussing the
application of this section when subsidies are involved.) "Direct costs of processing operations"
is defined to include those costs either "directly incurred in, or which can be reasonable allo-
cated to, the growth, production, manufacture or assembly of the specific merchandise under
consideration. 19 C.F.R. 10.178(a) (1990). These costs include, but are not limited to, labor,
machinery, research and development, and quality control. Id. However, costs which are not
directly attributable to processing operations may not be included, such as profit and general
expenses of doing business (administrative salaries, casualty and liability insurance, advertis-
ing, and commissions). 19 C.F.R. 10.178(b) (1990).
288. Articles means products. 19 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1988).
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the production of the eligible articles. 28 9 Nevertheless, a varying, an-
nual limit will be imposed on the amount of eligible articles that a
beneficiary developing country may export duty-free to the United
States. If a beneficiary developing country exceeds this limit, it will
lose the duty-free treatment with respect to the eligible article. 9 ' To
avoid such a harsh result, the President may designate the benefi-
ciary developing country as a least-developed beneficiary country,
thereby exempting it from the limit.291
For an association of countries that is a free-trade area or cus-
toms union, the President may similarly designate that all the associ-
ation members will be treated as one beneficiary developing coun-
try.292  However, the President is specifically prohibited from
289. However, countervailing duties will be assessed if the U.S. International Trade
Commission determines that a U.S. industry is being injured or threatened with injury, or
potential industry is being materially retarded. 19 U.S.C. 1671(a)-(b) (1988); 19 U.S.C. 2503-
(b)-(c) (1988).
Where materials are provided to the manufacturer at less than fair market value, the cost
or value of the materials is determined by adding all the costs associated with producing the
materials, an amount for profit, and the costs for transportation of the materials to the manu-
facturer's plant. 19 C.F.R. 10.177(c)(2) (1990). "Direct costs of processing operations" is
broadly defined to comprise those costs "either directly incurred in, or which can be reasonably
allocated to, [ . . the specific merchandise under consideration." See 19 C.F.R. 10.178(b)
(1990), supra note 287 for a more complete definition. These sections, read with 19 U.S.C.
2463(b)(2) (1988), which is concerned with the direct costs of processing operations performed
in the beneficiary developing country, allows for all respective costs in the value of an article,
whether or not incurred by the manufacturer, so long as these costs were incurred in a benefi-
ciary developing country.
Thus, the United States both expressly and constructively allows .for beneficiary develop-
ing country imports of eligible articles which are subsidized. This conclusion is derived from
the fact that subsidized eligible articles are expressly permitted per 19 U.S.C. 1671(a) (1988),
and i order to be imported duty-free, the U.S, Government will compute all material and
operational costs, though they were not wholly or actually incurred by the manufacturer, but
so long as the costs were incurred in a beneficiary developing country.
290. 19 U.S.C. 2464(c)(1) (1988). The annual limit is reached when one of these equa-
tions is satisfied:
1. The amount of an eligible article exported directly or indirectly to the United
States,
Amount of appraised value U.S. GNP 1990
$25,000,000 U.S. GNP 1974
2. The amount of an eligible article exported directly or indirectly to the United
States,
amount at appraised value total imports of article all BDCs
.2
Id.
In addition, if the President determines that the beneficiary developing country is becom-
ing competitive with respect to the eligible article, he may substitute, 1984 for 1974 and 25%
for 50% in the above paragraph, thereby increasing the limits on a beneficiary developing
country. 19 U.S.C. 2464(c)(2) (1988). Conversely, the President may also waive the limit's
application to a beneficiary developing country, but this waiver is subject to stringent require-
ments as set forth in 19 U.S.C. 2464(c)(3)-(4) (1988).
291. 19 U.S.C. 2464(c)(6)(A) (1988).
292. 19 U.S.C. 2462(a)(3) (1988). However, the annual limit imposed on eligible arti-
cles and conferral of least-developed beneficiary country status apply strictly to individual
countries, and not to an association of countries. 19 U.S.C. 2464(c)(7) (1988).
An association of countries, eligible for such collective designation as a beneficiary devel-
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granting beneficiary developing status to any country that is a mem-
ber of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). 293 Thus, the President may treat, for beneficiary developing
country purposes, eligible member countries of an association as one
country, while excluding the ineligible members of the association. 294
In addition, an exclusion of ineligible members is possible even if
these members are affiliated with GATT and have formed and Arti-
cle XXIV customs union or free-trade area.2 96
At the time of the passage of the United States Trade Act of
1974, all the individual Maghrebine Countries were considered for
possible beneficiary developing country status.29 However, only Mo-
rocco and Tunisia were awarded beneficiary developing country sta-
tus;29' Mauritania was granted even more favorable concessions as a
least-developed beneficiary country. 298 Algeria and Libya were never
granted beneficiary developing status since they were members of
OPEC.299
oping country, also includes one which is contributing to comprehensive regional economic
integration among its members. 19 U.S.C. 2462(a)(3) (1988).
On March 18, 1982, President Reagan proclaimed all members of the Caribbean Com-
mon Market to be treated as one country with respect to eligible articles for the purposes of
the Generalized System of Preferences since each member had already been designated as a
beneficiary developing country and the Caribbean Common market satisfied the considerations
of 19 U.S.C. 2462(c) (1988). President's Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate Concerning Countries of the Caribbean Common Market, 18 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 343 (Mar. 18, 1982).
293. 19 U.S.C. 2462(b)(2) (1988).
294. 19 C.F.R. 10.171 (1990). One example of when such a situation took place is when
President Reagan deleted Brunei Darassalam and Singapore from the members of the Associa-
tion of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), an association which received beneficiary devel-
oping country status as one country. Proclamation No. 5,805, reprinted in 24 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 548 (Apr. 29, 1988).
295. There is no express provision in the GATT which states otherwise.
At the time of the deletion referred to in supra note 294, Singapore was a GATT mem-
ber. The succession of Sinagpore to the GATT took place on August 20, 1973, and its rights
and obligations retroactively dated from August 9, 1965. GATT, 20 BISD 19 (1974).
The ASEAN formed a regional, preferential trading arrangement in 1977 pursuant to
GATT Part IV article XXXVI(l)(f), and since Singapore was a GATT member, the ASEAN
had to be approved by the Contracting Parties due to the inherent violation of MFN in a
preferential trading arrangement. This approval was achieved in 1979. GATT, 26 BISD 224
(1 980). This preferential trading agreement is relatively similar in import to that of a customs
union or free-trade area, given that approval by the Contracting Parties is required.
Since the ASEAN is a GATT approved preferential trading arrangement, and the GATT
has not admonished the United States for its selective tariff concessions to ASEAN members,
the implication is that there is no implied obligation to accord all members of a preferential
trading arrangement, customs union or free-trade area similar tariff concessions. Of course,
this argument is only applicable with respect to better-than-MFN tariff concessions which a
developed contracting party may give to a developing contracting party in accordance with the
spirit of Part IV to the GATT.
296. 4 U.S. CODE & CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 7186, 7350 (1974).
297. Presidential proclamation 5,365 of August 30, 1985, 50 F. 36220 (Sept. 5, 1985).
Also, the Western Sahara was accorded beneficiary developing status though it is recognized
as a non-independent territory. Id.
298. Proclamation No. 6,123, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,075 (1990), reprinted in 26 weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 658 (Apr. 26, 1990).
299. See 4 U.S. CODE & CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7186, 7351 (West 1974) where Alge-
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The United States will designate the Arab Maghreb Union as
one country for beneficiary developing country purposes should the
Union satisfy the requirement of a customs union. Nevertheless, Al-
geria and Libya will always be exempt from receiving duty-free
treatment for any eligible articles even though they are members of
the Union who receives beneficiary developing status from the
United States. In the unlikely event that a political union is formed,
resulting in the Maghreb becoming one country with OPEC mem-
bership, the United States will withdraw its beneficiary developing
country and least-developed beneficiary country tariff concessions. If
the Arab Maghreb Union, as a political union acceded to GATT, a
precarious situation could unveil itself. The United States, as a
GATT contracting party,30 0 may find, itself according MFN status to
Libya30 ' as a member of the Union."0 2
IV. Conclusion
The Arab Maghreb Union constitutes five countries with very
diverse political and economic policies. A political union will not be
realized without having first undergone substantial economic cooper-
ation. Even this economic cooperation, no matter how minimal and
despite the potentially great rewards, will be difficult to achieve due
to the vast divergences in economic policy - divergences that the
AMU Treaty does little to alleviate. Although GATT will not hinder
the formation of a customs union in the Arab Maghreb Union, other
obstacles exist. Each of the members, excluding Libya, receives im-
portant tariff preferences from developed states. These preferences
come with many requirements relating to the origin of a product and
to its direct important from the country receiving the preference to
the grantor of the preference. This vertical alignment makes the for-
mation of a successful regional trading block tenuous at best, where
instead products ought to be traded horizontally. Cooperation in or-
der to give effect to the Arab Maghreb Union, therefore, is not only
essential within the framework of the Union, but is required of the
developed nations as well.
rian and Libyan membership in OPEC is stated.
300. GATT, supra note 234, at 1.
301. See infra note 139 and accompanying text where President Reagan imposed a total
trade ban on Libya.
302. Otherwise, the United States would have to refuse application of GATT to all
members of the Union pursuant to GATT Article XXXV. GATT, supra note 234, art.
XXXV. Nevertheless, the United States would continue granting BDC status to certain mem-
bers of the Union and not to others.
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